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Abstract 
Anomaly detection in telecommunications call data tries to discover deviant behaviour of individ-
ual subscribers, caused by customer churn or attrition, potential fraud, deliberate or unintended 
expensive mistakes in call data, bad debt risk, or even improper disconnection of communication 
lines. Malicious behaviour has been noted as one of the key causes of such anomalies, which have 
consequently led to unquantifiable losses of revenue to many telecommunication networks world-
wide. Although the intentions of most subscribers to these networks are unknown when making 
phone calls, their behaviour pattern is reflected in their call data. 
Recent studies have investigated the challenges of anomaly detection but have not given conclusive 
solutions to address this problem. In this work, we infer that if appropriate individual probabilistic 
models are used for anomaly detection, the true positive rates of the approaches can be maximized, 
while the false alarms can be minimized. In this research, we present a modelling technique that 
can efficiently facilitate anomaly detection that will help call analysts and managers with adaptive 
decision-making. We developed and implemented a Data 'fransformation System (DTS), a new Hy-
brid Genetic Algorithm (HGA) and an Anomaly Detection System (ADS) to address this challenge. 
The HGA mines Behavioural Bayesian Networks (BBNs) for individual subscribers from call data 
pre-processed by the DTS, and the ADS trains and acts on these BBNs. Our results are validated 
with publicly available data and with empirical evaluation results of the ADS, using real world 
land-line call data for subscribers of a local Telecommunication Services Provider (TSP). Hence, 
the results provide an illustrative approach of addressing anomaly detection in telecommunication 
networks. 
Keywords: Genetic Algorithms, Bayesian Networks, Subscriber / Network Management, Anomaly 
Detection System. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Telecommunications Service Providers (TSPs) that have the ability to detect changes in the be-
haviour of their subscribers, will be able to take timely actions in order to minimise their losses. 
The term anomaly refers to an outlier or to a deviant pattern that can easily be spotted in small 
datasets but is hidden and requires intelligent detection in the massive amounts of call data gen-
erated in telecommunications environments. Common inconsistencies in call data are caused by 
customer churn or attrition, failure in networks [60], potential fraud [57], [43], [51], deliberate or 
unintended expensive mistakes made by telecommunications' workers, changes in subscribers' bud-
get on phone calls, bad debt risk and improper disconnection of communication lines. Anomalies 
in telecommunication call data can also be caused by malicious behaviour, which results in the loss 
of billions of dollars and wastage of network resources worldwide each year. 
The most common cause of anomalies is fraud, because it is committed intentionally and it is 
difficult to combat. Since fraud is spreading in telecommunication companies in various countries 
[57], [43], [25], some examples of South African networks that have the potential to be subjected to 
these anomalies include Telkom, Cell-C, Vodacom and MTN [21], [63]. To complicate the situation 
further, network carriers often do not want to admit that fraud exists as an anomaly in their 
systems, so that their subscribers do not suspect that fraud is a significant problem. If they do 
acknowledge it as a significant problem, it might cause churn or cause more subscribers to try to 
commit fraud. Instead, they prefer this problem to be solved confidentially. If the subscribers 
suspect fraud but nonetheless keep paying for debts that they did not incur and for services that 
they did not receive, and if the Telecommunication Services Provider (TSP) does not find a solution 
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to the problem, these customers may decide to seek alternative competing service providers. 
Subscriber calls are characterised by an on-going transformation of their behaviour which appear in 
a non-linear order. That is, call behaviour changes at irregular intervals. An example is a subscriber 
who normally makes short period international calls at irregular intervals during off-peak periods. 
If this subscriber then makes long duration calls during peak periods, this behaviour contradicts 
the subscriber's call patterns. These deviations might have been caused by a mistake made by the 
TSP administration, potential fraud etc. In such a situation, the TSP must be able to recognise 
these deviations, learn from these deviations and take the appropriate actions in order to maintain 
security. This research includes an in-depth investigation into unlawful acts in fixed and mobile 
line networks, unsupervised modelling and experiments regarding the early detection of anomalies 
in fixed line call data. We could not perform tests on mobile call data due to inability of getting 
the data and the confidentiality issues on the networks. 
Anomalies are often caused by fraud. Telecommunication fraud types can be classified into two 
categories: subscription and superimposed fraud [57], [38]. Subscription fraud results from an 
illegal subscription to a service using a false identity without the intention of paying for the service. 
Superimposed fraud is committed by impersonators who use a network without permission and incur 
additional charges to a caller's bill. Efficient detection of these anomalies can help call analysts to 
identify these anomalies when they occur, to understand how and why they have occurred, and to 
act appropriately to prevent recurrence. It will reduce the risk of call analysts making bad decisions 
and will minimise telecommunication revenue losses based on malicious behaviour. 
In this research, we implemented three systems to recognise anomalies, learn from the anomalies 
and act upon the anomalies. The Data Transformation System (DTS) pre-processes the data 
and prepares the data for optimal interpretation. The Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA) mines 
individual probabilistic models in the form of cause-effect relationships called Behavioural Bayesian 
Networks (BBNs). The Anomaly Detection System (ADS) uses Bayesian learning to train these 
models from the call data, and uses Bayesian inference in these models to detect anomalies. 
Both Bayesian inference and Bayesian learning center around Bayes' rule for updating or revising 
beliefs in light of new evidence. In our research we want to calculate for example the probability 
that a call is anomalous given a particular subscriber's behaviour. That is; we want to deal with 
2 
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1.1. PROBLEM DEFINITIONS, MOTIVATIONS AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
expressions of the form: 
Pr(a call regular I Subscriber's behaviour). 
The above expression represents the conditional probability that a call is regular, given a sub-
scriber's behaviour, 
or 
Pr(a call = anomalous I Subscriber's behaviour). 
the conditional probability that a call can be classified as an anomaly, given the subscriber's be-
haviour. Bayes' rule is covered in more detail in later sections. 
1.1 Problem Definitions, Motivations and Research Questions 
Service providers are greatly challenged when subscribers, who feel uncomfortable with their ser-
vices, including for example: over-charging, not answering queries promptly, or generally bad cus-
tomer service, change to competing carriers. It results in a loss of revenue [21], which can be 
attributed to anomalies. Service providers that can detect and adapt to anomalies will be able to 
minimise their losses. 
Researchers have thus far focused more on anomaly detection in mobile call data, with little or no 
research being conducted on anomaly detection in land lines. Although the latter may not cause 
such a great a loss as in mobile phone lines, they are still part of carrier losses in general and thus 
need to be combated. For instance, the real data from the federal communications commission [20] 
states that carriers lose more than 150 million dollars per year and Brooks [7] estimate 900 million 
dollars per year on anomalies caused by fraud in United States. Telecommunication anomaly is a 
problem in many developed countries and the numbers are increasing in areas such as Africa [21], 
[63]. Frayne [21] currently reported that half a million dollars is lost to common fraud schemes 
each day, and the numbers are increasing in Africa. 
Currently, one of the prevailing methods for combating anomalies is incorporated into block crediting 
[19] [28]. This means a bill is sent to the customer, who either approves or disapproves of the billed 
3 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
1.1. PROBLEM DEFINITIONS, MOTIVATIONS AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
amount. This can result in arguments, which could frustrate either party. Moreover, this approach 
is expensive and may contain errors. 
Existing approaches to anomaly detection include rule-based systems [19], statistical systems [43], 
neural networks [6], Bayesian networks by segmenting users into groups [28] or distance-based 
systems [2]. These are powerful techniques but their anomaly detection accuracy are limited as 
discussed in the next paragraphs. A generalised limitation is that most of these techniques use 
summarised call data as models and are therefore regarded as being approximated. Our technique 
is different from these as we tried to minimise approximations. 
Minimising approximations in experimental research was suggested as a contribution to the ac-
curacy of scientific results [28], [58]. In light of this, the limitati n of approximating a model 
can be improved by using probabilistic models for individual subscribers. Modelling subscribers 
individually is complex due to the high non-linearity of subscriber behaviours and due to the ex-
plosive technological advancement in phone services (see Chapter Two). In this research, we used 
individual modelling as one of the contributions to minimising approximation in the detection of 
anomalies. 
The effectiveness of existing anomaly detection techniques are complicated by the fact that the call 
datasets are distributed over various sites, such as geographical service base stations, in different 
data format types, such as csv and databases. Furthermore, call datasets contain mixed attributes 
(continuous and nominal attributes). A nominal attribute may contain alphabetical names or 
numeric values (e.g. "Name" or "2006"). Continuous attributes contain only decimal/integer 
values (e.g. 2.4, 5.56) while a mixed attribute space is a collection of both continuous and nominal 
attributes in a dataset. The differences in the call datasets in various sites can be attributed to the 
problem of multiple vendors that prepare the datasets for TSPs. Most of the existing systems have 
access to few subscribers' call data but the real life data we used for our test was obtained from 
many service based stations. 
Many of the existing methods disregard the mixed attribute space but detect anomalies in a contin-
uous attribute space using absolute or distance-based approaches [2], which may result in the loss 
of information that will affect the detection qualities. In distance-based approach, Bay [2] defined 
a point value and a minimum deviation expected from that value. If a new value is to be detected, 
it must not deviate more than what is expected. Moreover, absolute approaches mostly use fixed 
values for comparisons, and it is difficult for these values to change as the behaviour of subscribers 
4 
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1.1. PROBLEM DEFINITIONS, MOTIVATIONS AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
change. For instance, a subscriber who has been noted to make five calls per day and suddenly 
changes his behaviour by making nine calls, will be classified as an anomaly by a distance-based 
approach. This may not necessarily be true. 
Most of the existing systems use pre-defined detection rules [19], [6] pre-classified anomalies in 
training set or use segmentation of users into groups [28], [43] but their quality of detections and 
abilities in the detection of changing behaviour are questionable. 
Most existing anomaly detection systems mentioned above operate in batch mode [65], [43]. This 
mode creates a lag time that can be exploited by deceitful subscribers. A reduced lag-time will 
enable service providers to detect and act upon anomalies faster, which will reduce the damage 
caused by these behaviours without the appropriate intervention. 
In view of all these, we are motivated to use individual models that can adapt within a transactional 
processing system (daily processing). The following research questions are investigated in this study: 
• How can call data be observed and transformed so that the underlying models of individual 
subscribers can be mined efficiently? 
Data transformation is worthy of investigation because Cantu [9] suggested that combining 
discretisers with evolutionary algorithm such as genetic algorithm, is an interesting future 
development. We therefore included a discretiser as a subsystem of our data transformation. 
One of the expectations of our data transformation was to contribute in maximising true 
positive rates and minimise false alarm rates of our anomaly detection results. 
• Can a genetic algorithm be used to mine optimal Bayesian network models from telecommu-
nications call records? 
Positive testimonies exist from early researchers about using a Genetic Algorithm (GA) to 
mine Bayesian network structures from data. Wai [67] demonstrated and showed that a GA 
is superior for discovering extremely good networks from large datasets. 
• How can we develop a prediction model based on Bayesian networks so that anomalies can 
be detected in customers' behaviour? 
Prediction models based on Bayesian networks have been applied to several applications, 
such as medicine to diagnose diseases [40]. We are motivated to apply this technology to 
telecommunications data. 
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1.2. RESEARCH APPROACH 
The objectives of our studies were to illustrate the capabilities of Bayesian networks technology 
and integrate them into our prototype 4.1 to overcome most of the problems stated in the previous 
paragraphs. Our findings on the research questions and how we achieved these objectives are 
discussed in the next section. 
1.2 Research Approach 
We started this research by investigating the deceitful and intentional telecommunications anomaly 
(fraud) types. The unlawful acts and how they are committed were investigated and are presented 
in later sections. We defined a structure in Figure 2.1 that shows how one fraud type is linked 
to another, for both landlines and mobile networks. The detailed investigation was carried out 
because deceitful anomalies are more difficult to detect than other anomaly types. We believe 
that our investigation results will provide insightful information to service providers in order to 
understand bad practices in their networks. 
After carrying out an analysis on call data, we designed and implemented the DTS that transforms 
call data so that individual subscribers' models can be mined successfully. The DTS consists of three 
subsystems, including: the filtering subsystem, the discretization subsystem, and the user-collection 
subsystem, whose detailed functionalities are explained in Chapter Four. The DTS observes and 
transforms subscribers' call data, and consequently answers our first research question. 
For the purpose of subscriber call behaviour modelling, we developed and implemented a new 
genetic algorithm (HGA) from the domain of evolutionary algorithms. The HGA uses information 
theoretic measures and mathematical components to mine BBNs for individual subscribers. Our 
individual BBN modelling technique is an improvement over the existing detection systems, which 
include rule-based systems [19], statistical systems [43], neural networks [6], Bayesian networks by 
segmenting users into groups [28] or distance-based systems [2]. These are discussed in detail in 
section, Related Research in Telecommunications Anomaly Detection. The HGA is a variant of 
classical genetic algorithms. It is unique in that we produced two generations and evolved higher 
generations avoiding redundant offspring. As a result of these, the HGA answers our second research 
question. More details are described in our methodology in Chapter Four. 
For the purpose of intelligent telecommunications anomaly detection, we designed and implemented 
the Anomaly Detection System (ADS) from the domain of probabilistic and mathematical concepts. 
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1.3. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
The ADS acts on the BBNs and detects anomalies in mixed attribute datasets under a variety of 
constraints, including for example: minimising response time using transactional processing. We 
used daily transactions in this research for incremental training of the BBNs. [55] proposed the 
detection of outliers from data in real time. The ADS can do detection per single transaction (real 
time) but in our prototype, we process the detection in batches of daily transactions. This improves 
on most existing batch anomaly detection systems. The ADS answers our last research question. 
More details are described in Chapter Four. 
Therefore, our fundamental objective is to maximise correct predictions and minimise incorrect 
predictions at an acceptable level. The next section presents our research contributions. 
1.3 Research Contributions 
This research has contributed the following knowledge: construction of a new algorithm called the 
Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA), which falls in the research domain of Evolutionary Algorithms; 
the mining of multiply-connected Bayesian networks with our algorithms; building a Bayesian Net-
work for each individual subscriber to improve on generalised anomaly detection models; and mining 
networks from mixed or nominal datasets(which is done by most existing systems [31], [30], [22]), 
as well as mining networks from numerical datasets. 
The DTS, the BBN and the ADS implemented in this research contribute to the new research area 
of Bayesian networks applied to anomaly detection. We achieved adaptive intelligence by our HGA 
that mined individual subscriber models, trained by the ADS using daily transactions, and used 
by the ADS to detect anomalies in real time of daily batch transactions. The degrees of belief (or 
level of confidence) obtained from the ADS about anomalous calls will assist network carriers to 
make reliable decisions and will reduce false alarm rates. 
Each of the DTS, HGA, mined BBNs and ADS contributes to a different aspect of solving the prob-
lems mentioned above with respect to observing and transforming call data, individual subscriber 
modelling, and improving the quality of anomaly detection. 
The implementation results of this research are primarily intended to help TSPs to understand how 
to recover revenue losses through explanatory and exploratory approaches, pattern recognition, 
detection, and acting upon anomalies. 
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1.4. PRINCIPAL RESEARCH RESULTS 
In view of these, the positive response from early users of telecommunication modelling was that 
this approach holds great promise that subscriber modelling may one day become a standard tech-
nique of business decision making, especially in emerging and rapidly changing telecommunication 
markets [12]. 
1.4 Principal Research Results 
The implementation results of our genetic algorithm (HGA) have demonstrated a very good mod-
elling capability, when validated with real life telecommunications call data; when evaluated with 
publicly available data [50], [49]; and compared with some open source software programs [69]. All 
these results were accomplished from the informative training sets that were generated from our 
DTS. The detail results are in Chapter Five. 
The implementation of our ADS generated interesting detection results when we experimented with 
daily call detection and during three evaluation test cases. The overall average detection is 85.878 %. 
The ADS performs detection on calls that are made to both existing and new destination numbers. 
Experiments on daily call detection produced very good results. Test case one detected anomalies 
within every subscriber's behaviour and produced good degrees of beliefs (levels of confidence) on 
every detection. Test case two was to confirm the reliability of our ADS and to determine if it could 
differentiate between two subscribers' behaviours. The results of test case two clearly detected call 
patterns that belong to two different subscribers. Test case three was used to ascertain that known 
anomalies could be detected effectively by our ADS. The detail is in Chapter Five. 
1.5 Organisation of thesis 
Chapter One includes the introduction, the definition of the problems, the objectives, the mo-
tivations for using anomaly detection and the research questions. The principal results are also 
highlighted. 
Chapter Two contains an in-depth literature review of telecommunications anomalies and the re-
views of prior work done by other researchers in anomaly detection and Bayesian modelling. 
Chapter Three includes the research background on probabilistic modelling and an in-depth de-
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1.5. ORGANISATION OF THESIS 
scription on mining Bayesian networks. 
Chapter Four describes the main methodology, which contains the system model, the Data Trans-
formation System (DTS), Bayesian modelling and the Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA), and lastly, 
the Anomaly Detection System (ADS). 
Chapter Five presents the implementations, simulations, the evaluation and the experimental re-
sults. 
Chapter six contains the summary and interpretation of results, future research, contributions to 
knowledge, and concluding remarks. Also, we included the following at the appendix: implemen-
tation designs, implementation results and list of publications. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Overview and the details of the problem 
A number of causes of anomalies in subscriber behaviour have been identified in the introduction, 
namely: customer churn or attrition, potential fraud, deliberate or unintended expensive mistakes 
in call data, changes in subscribers' income, or even improper disconnection of communication lines. 
It is known that fraud in telecommunication is usually a deceitful type of anomaly [25], [51], which 
requires further elaboration. It can also be an indication that a customer is entering into bad debt. 
In bad debt risk, a subscriber pays for his/her first two bills after opening an account, uses the 
network and never pays new bills again [57], [38]. This suspicious behaviour needs to be checked 
quickly. For instance, a subscriber is not expected to be making extremely high frequency costly 
calls within a very short period of time, when s/he has been used to making infrequent very cheap 
calls over a long period of time. This could be suspicious and regarded as anomalous. 
According to Frayne [21], telecommunications industry worldwide currently loses half a million 
dollars to common fraud schemes each day, and the numbers are increasing in Africa. For example, 
operators in South Africa have already experienced major setbacks to innovative services as a result 
of fraud [21]. To understand the detection of anomalies, specifically fraud, the following sections 
clarify and classify the different types of fraud committed worldwide, including South Africa [63], 
[21] and describe how they are committed. 
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2.1. OVERVIEW AND THE DETAILS OF THE PROBLEM 
2.1.1 Anomalies in Telecommunications Call Data 
Telecommunication services providers (TSP) could protect themselves and their subscribers against 
deceitful anomalies by using intelligent models or systems that can recognise, learn from and act 
on fraud. Figure 2.1 illustrates the interrelationships of the known fraud types. This diagram is a 
pictorial representation of fraud types discussed by various researchers [1], [7], [10]. This diagram 
includes only fraud and not other anomalies such as debt or possible churn. Churn in subscriber 
management means a subscriber quitting a service for another within a telecommunication network. 
Also, a review of anomaly detection techniques and their limitations are described in section; Related 
Research in Telecommunications Anomaly Detection. 
When one receives a business offer over the telephone, one regards it as telemarketing. If the person 
online is anonymous, then it could be a fraudulent venture. It may be difficult for an intelligent 
model to trap telemarketing fraud because a telephone subscriber may voluntarily decide to become 
a victim of it [7]. The subscriber becomes a victim by accepting the business offer and by providing 
personal bank account information which can be used to make a false subscription to a network 
(see next section). 
2.1.2 Fixed or Land Line Phones 
Fraudsters operate on both fixed lines and mobile phones. Fraud is committed in these networks 
in both developed and u derdeveloped countries. In 2001 half a million-fixed lines in South Africa 
were disconnected, many as a result of fraudulent activities [21]. Consequently, it made the country 
dropped from third to fifth on the list of African countries with the highest level of telephone 
marketing. Figure 2.1 shows that the major fraud types are superimposed and subscription fraud. 
Fraud is said to be superimposed when an impersonator illegally steals resources from legitimate 
users by gaining access to their phone accounts. The impersonator is said to be an insider when 
the fraud is committed by an employee of a TSP. Superimposed fraud is external when committed 
by unscrupulous members of the general public. 
In the case of subscription fraud, a fraudster illegitimately obtains a legal account and uses services 
without intending to pay the bills. 
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:!.1. O\'i:::HI'I1:'j\" "H'iD THE DETAILS OF THE PRomE,\[ 
Fi"nre 2.2, Public Landlin~ Tra.'lsmission Path 
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p;:_ibly u>iIl~ tlw "o-calkd loud loop, HIld it call be oone' for c"Jllllm'Il'i,d or for priwtl' noe A 
local loop is the tran,mi"ion path from a k"al cnstomer's ,>hone to "h~ do,,>;! local office of tlw 
Ti'*",rrHl1lLniNLI.H)r\ s"rvi"", ['rm'idN (TS I' ), A had"'r c~n r.1",) I':ain ",:;''''''' to a ,nb,cribcr network 
lhro,,~h o<','('ral ral1l.rial~ 1.0 it' p),nX (I'''ivf<.l.~ A,,\orn~l.ic. nrfi11ch AXc.han~e), which ronn"" .:; l.h~ 
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2. 1. OVEHF1E\V ASO THE OETI\ lLS OF THE rR08LEJJ 
Figure 2.2 SI IO"""S il. pu hlic 1I'1: ld ll l1" tr;\l ltil n i",,, i, m 1 .... 11. F'rlllh ::--lt-r", ('HIl 1'1I .... ily t<lp i:ltu 01 her ... ull-
scl·il)('r,..· IKtO\ll its 1J1:'l llg i'i pccI~l if;cd tool,. applin! to the Iflu d lllw tffln"llIh'sio ll ,);,tlt .... T il :" is a ll 
(,xllmp JC' (I[ ('xternal supt'rim po"f'<i fraud. 
III ;;uh~cript iHIl (mud I;,). ~ swind ler steal" t he per..ur .. d hauk .).Ci."Olwt d ata (e.g. aCCOUll ~ uUl!lucr) 
or SQIllP{)IlC who s il l/ .... erilx'!' 1.0 the .~ amp or d iffe re llt :1 C'L wor k (T SP ) .Utl! Io(oill:' :\n ·.f'Si'i to a land line 
SC'1" viC(' frolll 1\ g ivcn td epbollP operll.t.Ol" . T hl' If gal Ih e rs mHy not i('(' t hE' slI b,,('r ip t ioll fra lld o nly 
Oil their accoun t , if they nre very ob:;e rva llt. Fixed line swi nr.krs o ft e ll ti l l1Y (lIll:,--' te i llporaril~' in a 
hOllsc o r apnr t mcn\ , in orciC'r to conceal t/wir wl:e rf'abf)!lts . 
2.1.:3 Mohile Phones 
'I' ll(' su l)S("ription frAUO explni nPd Il.h.)V(' a pplie::; to :Hohilt"' ,,1'("O11!' I. t'\wor ks too. It is COllHllOIl and 
occurs frC<lucllt l.\,. 
SupenmpoM'.t/ fraud is COlllm iLted whell imrerso: .a~o~s j.{illn ac("(..'SS to the f[('CO •. ll lS of leJ!;i t imnte 
UM"r::. by st('i'l ling their II ll i'l' I!' i\lohile Icie nt ifi ca t io!1 ;\"umlwr (r..n:-;-) 'd Id l::'-plipmt.': ll Se~ia l ;\"ulIluer 
(ES\") to pE'rfonn dOIl'myor !JpoojiIlY. Spoofing ~e fe:'S to trle action o f fl. phone no.{' r who pr{'tenris 
to I>e S>.) lllCOU(' else. :\ p!tOIlt' j:. snid to be cloned w:.en a Su lhLr il 'f'r IfiC'nt ifi(,Atir"n ~Iodll ie ( S I~[) 
card is n 'pm )!,rH HU II(''(J t.o t r l1 l11;l!lit til(' MIN / E Sf\' I;('lo llgi ng: t ' ) <..1101 h ... r Il.'gi t i,:lfltf· ~f'1l ph'-'He [7J. 
Thc d Olling, wu illt io l1!' [151 are given b",low: 
• 811!dIJpt - 1 dllpl ie:d .• :1' "Illy Olll' l\ IJN / F.SN o t! fl. IW W SI l\ / (n rt! . 
• 8uiJtYP"-2 is II ty pe of roaming fraud wht'f€ :rlore t lt all 011(' l\ J1N / ESN Me stored on 11 SIM 
c(lrd. T he; ('onl innOll$ ('.h an~ing from onp '\ !lK i ESN l() Itllot l:cr is cHlINI t. umbling because 
('ad ) ("all i~ bilh,o to Oil(' '\ [1 1\" / ESN fit a timc. T hus, it L., difficult for lh(' Owners to lJotice 
ill<'ghl calls. 
• SlIbl'Yl't -:f is li fe t imc plulllc f r<lud . In this ,1\.-;';', Itf> fr,l,llrl:-kf"S could r.1'IIH1lllly prO~fl llI 
RIIV ~IlN I ES\" stolen t hro llr;h handset kC~'jhld". 
SuiJ.-.cril lf'rs 1\1'(' idf' lIti fil' .. l lI ... illJ..; a MIIIII'/ ca.ni called a SI.\ I (Suh ... nil lt"r idf' lltifk;\t i{'1l t., I(1dlllt"' J, whid l 
cOlltai u .... t ltt' ~ I IN / ESN. Tht, .\ Il l' a nd ES N ti..h: t LL' l ollulI'il.!~ furm:;' 
!"1fT;\" = Contiucllt cod ..... .,... Co\!ll t ry code + T SP type + Pho llt' hur::.iwr. 
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2.1. OVERFlEW ASO T il E DETAILS OP THE PfwnU:.\1 
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If a frfl lldsll'r impClbOnates a lCJ:,<lt inmtc Ilser with a ",to\C!n MIN ; ES)I , tlw legicmllte u!>er i ~ bi lled. 
Rcsc<.ud l !la.s ~hl)w!l ! hil l \ heft is <l:1 ,)1 her type of "pri" :l~ dereitfu l fr, . d in the I1l(J:":!C pliOHC indust ry 
[25J. WIlt'n a mobil" phone b ~to\en , i L i~ ~ti\l ~uperi!ll;)oserl on a lcgid Il~'r hy ~P()()f. llg the nC! lwork. 
An example of II victim is a sub:;cribcr who is on cor..: roct pho[lf' and pays monl hlv bills to the TSP. 
Another example if; Ill(' spoofing of a pre-paid phone with we;) 1000'\(led uirlimC'. ' I he slolen pholle 
continlle's to be used by the fraudster until it is reponed to t:1C TSP for hlca;]..;.;.g(', lmt only if the 
owner remembers his or lH'r Perwllal Idelltification Nultlber (f'I l\-). 
The superimposed frand {'onld ~ intem<ll or exr;erna\ [4:.l]. A ~ in thC' (,H.<;e of :nnd li nes, internal 
fraud here is committed hy employees who murlll:acture tile sni cards. Supcrimp05('(I fraud is ~aid 
10 be external when un¥:rupulou~ people d oae a s:o:('a ~nN ! ESN onto 11. new ~murt curd or keep 
11II ~pu.)fi lll:\ a .. toleu phollc. \Vhcn i\ stolen phone i,., reportCO"I , s?uIJling s!.Ops be(';l.IIs(· Ole hllX ; 
ES~ is hlockf'd . hut till' phone ('Quid st ill be uSNI fu r: lwr fo r d()ll i n~. 
D c fidclIl. Sc(:ur'ity ill Mob il~ Phone Networks 
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a pl"'rilJdic b ill dehits i\ legal ballk aCCOUllt. RpseMrh ~h0""'S tim: sub'">Cription frllud is mo~tly 
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type of fraud will take time to be resolvro by the TSP. 
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2.1. ()Vl:.'INIt;W ASD THE DETAILS OF T HE PHOlJLEM 
2.1 .-1 Tilt, U ulawful I\rlt'lho<ls of Obtaining SN;urit.y N lIlHbc l '!o, 
Deficient J\IIN I ES N S('curity 
The llllJawfullHcthod:; of trappin~ tilC!>e security l'IH:tLf'TS 'U'(' <:,ummarin>r.l lwl. )w· 
.Eavc:;uroppitlj.!;: Tilt, fruudsters use an antenna, ur a softwarf'-b(\S('d elect.ronic Clobil(' commulIka-
l.ion scann('t tel t.rap vnlid i\lIN I ESX !lumbers by i~1cgally Itu,mitoring the radio Wf1.\'C transmissions 
fWIlI the cell phones of legitimate subscribers. 
Crackinj.!;: A speriali:;("d ('omputer i.~ 1[:;&1 to read +;le <~dIlJl menu (,f ft mohil<- pholl(, to tmp the 
t.lll\ I I~S N . llamlS('1 t('('ilnicians and motor \'chicle t:t('(·hfl.lii(~ ;~re t:'llally illVO.\'Cd in tl tis dubious 
hllsincs. .. pranirc. 
'I'll(' U nlawfu l T("c h uiquc"h of Discovcring, Subscribcr'.-; P IN Numher~ 
Shoulder Surfing' T his i ... tiU' t('('iln iqnl' or SjJ.vb~ 01. n~rs Whl'" tlwy "lIt .. r trW: f PIN., in puhlie 
pill(:('S ~hrougll the" IISC of cameras, t{'lf'l;('Opes or looki:lg over tllf'ir "hOllklt'rs. 
Scanning I Cracking: This involves the usc of a computc~ a~ld H 1:)("(ju('ntial numh(' r dial-oul 
program t.o (,btdin tl1I' Pl:"J. 
Social Eugil1c C'rin g: Thi~ is a traditional crimir.al tf'dmiqu(' to trick g\lllihk pcopl(' iuto rcvcaling: 
their :;c(;urity llulllLcr, llclicvilll!; that this is H'quircd for le~jtimale purpoS('s. 
2 .1 .5 The Const.raint.s of Analog, Digit.al and ESN / M IN 
Analog mobile phones (c.g, cdlulars) M(, cheap and do Ilot f'llcryp: ihfl :'I1 1j\; / ESN during, trans-
miSl)iOIl. This m,th'S it ("a .... i"'[" for fraud~teTl; to trap tl..e securit\, r.-o<ies. 
Tilc ~ II ;\" I F$t\ for digital plton('s (c.~. G~~·I) WHoS il:itl,'llly w{'L f'1H."rypwQ. during tmnsm i~ion but 
wa:. later (:ru(:k~1 (!tIadc simpler) because of t.he decr..ding dbi.lhrity from one oountry tU'twork to 
another [251. Ill1tial1y, w/JC'1l sop hist icated ennypti(,r. tcchnilju(':; w.n' u~1 to protect the security 
1l1l111bcrs for CSi\1 handsets, there \\'crc rC'StrictioH;; O:l aet~ and :>omu (;ounlries round it difficul~ 
t.o t!C<"rypt thClK' bN'allSC' of the expensive equipment I'f"tjllln-d A" a ["('~Illt, itltcrm.'twork Iinkitlg 
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2.2, PH/O/{ A,lV()MALY DETECTION .. \,I\,-D MODELLING RE.';EAHCl-l 
APPLJE'D TO BAYESIAN NETWORK S 
cOlUlt riN- II:. ,', ' Car more la.x senu ity which is eas::er to hr<:MII. L it:le or II') elltrYP'ic)II il'i u-,ff! with 
rl igital phones ill the:.e cou ll tric:s, which puts. I('gl ti:na te u"en. at ri~k of boJing dl.friluded [26], 
2,1,£i Thf' Pl'Oposp.d Sol u tio n for South Africa 
SoUl h Afdcan telephone Operators inlend to blacklist d"frawled SI~1 ellnis which may distnrh. 
but. not Stop lawbreakers. Uhck lisUng intends to tr.(l.ke hllnrlsut~ amI SIM ('d.n]:., mwlu:.s. Cnrrently, 
however. tiler!) is no uniform rule on hla~kliHt illg pli(}ues [59] . (;!'Qyli"ting im'o)w,:> blocking Sliv[ 
mrrls hilt nnt hanr!sets, lin approach that is alreae,y in practicc-. Tht'~' IIr(' i!lIp"rfect solutions as 
the lawbreakers uo 1101 rc:-.p('ct gow'rnmf'utal po.ki('s. CO!lS(.'quently. lllukill).!, appropriate laws for 
the telephone industry is a cim lleug"e for policy makerf>. 1t become:; lnhorioll1i for t.he govcTIIlllent 10 
kC<'p u"lIIkinS ;HId t' liforcilig laws t ( . arre:-t pet...ple wit!! fraudllknt v'lt-phone fl(·tiv:tics. lIow many 
crimi nals who 1)l"('!Ik th l'~l' lawb f.;au he arresied? T herefore, moN' intC'i liA('ut mO'\E'I:-; aIT' TNluir('ri 
1O \lIlderstawl and <ll'tL'<:1 <lllomaliL'l> in c..tll d,.t.a. When TS? del~ts too IIlflUY ,>.uolllolics in fixer! 
linc accounts. they ('u t down the phune lilies 11.:0 cp:.cniJ(>(1 bv FraynE' [2 1] for SO·lth Afrin .. 
2 .2 Prior A no ma ly D etec ion and lVIodell ing Research Applied to 
Bayesian Networks 
This section prcSl"mts the prior fillo maly oete<-tion apprullchf'S in paniel/lnr, to prevell! !.elccommuni-
cations anOll1ali t;s, ' I'hese approaches are: rule-bn::;ed. i>tatisticnl, ne\ lralIlClwork, 8<l.Yt'silll1 l)('tv,<orks 
allu Distullce·bUSl."'tl, They are good methorls hut they l"(""'quirc i!tl;)roWI1 IClll. r-.hlllY D.8pects. where 
1 hey arc- jil!lit NI in t'apahilitif>S w('m Sl fited in 1 he problem cit 'fillit iUllS ..t..'Ction in Clnt pler Olle. They 
on the two lllQl.t popu l1lr tL'dllliques of IlJooelling Ihyt'siltll lIe:wnrk. ... 
2.2. 1 P I'ior or n ~ latp.{1 RP.search in Telecommunications Anonl~ Jy Uetect.ion 
As mentioned (>fl.rJit'r. 1t lIun .h{'r o f I!wthoti. ... have ':)('(>11 u~ 1 f(., tf>k'('ouutlunicalioll anomaly detec~ 
tiou. Th,~ inriw l(': rIJI~ha .. -.erl nppro.<U"hes, stati ... t ica! teclmiql.~, llt'u r<tlllE'!\\'or;.cs. t1i~t,-tlJce-ba.,*,fl 
approaches, aud Bayc~il\n network .... [t wa. ... pre:;etltM ill r~ce"t Mudic:; t hflt Ufls ~Jperviscrll(>arnillg 
of BayesinH lIel,,;o rks for {momaly detection. which was investi~ateri in thi:. r(,'Sc/H.:h, is hettl!r than 
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2.2. PIUOH ANOMAI,l ' 1J1·;T/':CTlO,\· Af'.:D ;'vIQDELLll'.r(; RESEARCH 
A PPLIJ::D TO HA Yf.'SU N ,VSTH'ORJ<S 
nU1l 11 ri ... :. have> far ilion' hlX Sf'{"Urlty which is (,H.",I('r to hr<,ru;h. L;t.~ le o r no ... llcn·p t i()11 II> u.'>{'(1 wil h 
digi lal phull('S in lhoe wll llt ries, wh ich puts legil i:n<..tf' USf' fS at ri~ of b('illg <.!('frauded [26]. 
2. 1.0 TItC' Prop().'Scd So lution for South A fri ca 
South AfrinlU telephone operators intcud tu b la cklist d<'fraudt-d SIi\1 cards which may disturb. 
hut llOt stoplnw\)rcllkcl'!;. U bKkli~ti ng illtends to tn,J'if' hall(i--eh {Jhd SIM card!'> mi{'\css. CllrrclItly, 
lKlv.'Cver, r,IIf're is no ul\ifOrm rule Oll blacklisting phones [r)~Jl . Grey li:;ting illVolv(lli b locking SIM 
cn rds bllt l1ot, hfll l dSt> t ~, 1111 appnlll.ch t h l1t is ll iready in practice. Tht'St' nrC' impNffft solutions as 
the ll\whrcakt:r~ dv 1101. ~p«:t go\'crmncnta l policiES. COllSt"ql;(,llt.ly. makin .£!; IlJj;.l ropriat e laws for 
the tei<-phollc ind1lst ry i.~ 1~ challenge for policy r:mkcr". It bCC01~1(.'S lahuriou:; for t.Jw govf' rlllnf'1l1 to 
k('('p makilJ!; [ .. In ('uforcing l ilWS to arre,t proplt' with fraudulent t(']<"pholl(, IH' t iv:ti('S. How InlUlY 
crim inaJ:.. who hr('ak IbNi<' laws ca ll he arTCStcci'! Thl'rf'fo rt' . mort' ill t t.·lli);t.'ll t modds are T('quired 
to 1IIldcr:.tl.\lld and dctcct. fUioma lics in ca ll d .lta. \ \ 'hclI TSP G('U.,(·tll too 1m-illY a nomalies in fixed 
line accollnts. 1.1)('.'1 ('11 1. ciOWIi the pholle IiJl(':; a <: descri bed by FhWlle [2 1] for SOuth Africa. 
2.2 Prior Anomaly Detection and lVIode liing R esearch Applied to 
Bayesian Networks 
Th is sect iu lL pre~cllt~ the prior anomal y detection approlLches il l pHl't.ictl illr. to pn'\'t ut ,.eJecommulli-
ratiollii nnomnli c~. T h(;Sc approach('S arc: rnle-based, statistk1.tl, ueuruillctwurk , Baycsiall Ilct.vorks 
alld DistUllc(. .. bascd . Tiley are ~ood met hods bu t they requ ire i:nprovcn)(,llt. 1\1 any a,"pccts, where 
t hey are limited in ('a pabiliLies wt' r(' ;;\.awd in tile probl(>!ll d('fillitiun.<: ~'(;tiol\ ill Chaptl:r One. T hey 
011 thp twO mo:,t popu lar t<'ellll iqll<.'S (If moddlillg I3aypsiau HI': work~. 
2 .2 . 1 Pl' iol' 0 1' Itcla l ('d 1~ I ~SPill'ch ill Te lecommuu ica t ions Anomaly D e t ection 
As lIlcnl io!l(.-'(j earlier, it numher of methods have b.:-P-nll»{,,(] fo: 1t'I E'CO lIIUlllhio~tio: 1 allomal), det('c~ 
titll i. Th0>(' illd ud(': I'Ul ~ .... I"'1..-.('(l l\pproa('hf'ii,\ s.tati~ l ir1l1 t f'Clo tl iql.e-., tlt' IlTl\ l lI tI WOrk". d istaun--l)it.'<ctl 
appru.1.ches, il.lld I3nyesinll lIi'twurks. It Wfl.'i prft'(,llt ed i ll rCCt'lIl :;t u.\ieli that lat!lupcrvil't.-'(] I('[l.fnillg 
of Uayt.'sia n networks for tillolllaiy detection, whicb wa;; invcsligatC'f. in this res(,M('h, is twtt<'r than 
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2.2. FfUOR A.VOMALY DETEC'TIO,v A,VD AIODELUNG f{ESEA IW H 
A ppJ.I£1) TO 13A \~E8J;\ .'\· :YETH'OHKS 
Ul()St d f'\f'Cfioll tIIc ,thods [:l8], This il> lwCHN' it cll'"''' Ilt ,l rt-.r llliff' II prior knowlt'"(ig," o r I"ralJ(liJf'lIt 
data uud ('au rl('l('Ct III'W ar!OIwl. lir-;; froll! c"'lll d ata. 
Thf' nl.i('-bil, ... (l tCdlll iqlli'S w<1rk I~t with USN profil0i cOIIUii llil:p, t'xplic:il infonnnt:OI I, where '1111 IU I-
lily cri l pr J;) an" (' lIC<1d('(1 as ruk~ [19]. T hio; wdm iqnc i" not scaldblc u.:..rl i:. diffi<;u;t to llI'Ull.I.gf' beea uSf' 
it rpqui]"(~ t'xplki t r il les which i:. labo1\r-i ll tellsive aael ti!ll{'" t.o/\,.umill~, I:lllc\ ill\l JlvCl> p rugnli li millg 
fpr I'v!"r.\' i!lln~illi1hlc posl>ih l(' allollmly. It is difficult to in('orpCJnIl.1' IlI'W ill1orr,a:y typP" into ,,\tch 
rules a:4 tlw.v 0(;(;111" 'II II' p('rfOfl)lflllCC of tlu· n:k-'~)il .. .;ed H.pprO,~d l d .... f;I'i\des dlitsti('al ly a,~ til(' cal l 
data (size 1-;l"U\\'S, This I"uk' lVas llspd h.Y Fawcett )9: to cl a.~s i f.)' ('fl.:]'; ill 1\ s lt\J;;cr io{'l" ' s a{'cou !lt, for 
exampk: 
(Tillw-uf-f)ny = Night) AN D t Locatioll = Brollx; ~ fr;tud. 
T h., ru le a hu\'( ' ItICilliS this (" lIstOBlef d.x~ nor ll".kp calls a t llIf;hl in ll rollx. If Itt' dOl'S, all alarm 
should ht' ral.;o 'll. Thi~ IIIl1y l:or " Iways 1)(' r fl w si l; ('f' tlw Iwh!l viol1f of 1.lIP clht O)H('r ('(Il l dUl.ugp 
at a nylime. Our tlpprOadl takft! c l) re of thb e:fpct h ·{' I.v. Tlli" I'tppr().Iwh i~ de::<cdl:x:d III anomaly 
IlldlCHtOrs llud d .... l ... 'ctioll rC'S1I1 1S in Ch,l]llCTS FOllr ane Fi v(' 1"e;,pl't:t ivdy. 
Til ... . 'lttl / • .'l tll:(lilliCthods o f I-l.n,.)lnaiy del l"'(;t i()1) W()~t>:" \yell with t. l. ivl\ria\(' dj,;rr:hutiolls, whf'[t , the 
;lvcrxgc ('all d uratio n, til(' IOll g<'St cali elm,nio t! and the average r.lll:llicr of ellll:; pf'r dn,'" Me uS1lally 
(,OllIPIW,<1 with a prc-dc tcrmilllXl thrC'Shold [43'. As the thrCfholrl is takr'!l at a particular ti!l!c 
period. however , the sta t is t ical threshold Ill()del wit not adupt to chall~es ill ilH' call I)('ha\'ioll!" of 
a given (; \1stOl1 lcr . If the Humber of ca lif' for a dHy t'xr.l't.'(.b it.. nurmal hdllwioHr (t.1Jr"f'Sholrl), it is 
('MlSi d('r~(J il!> lutOlnnlit'!> whidl may not also be t rUI' 
Tb .. popular III!uml Ilci,l'Ol'k t cch nology [6] employs feature cxtt<lct irJll, whnc Sllll \ll\w'i.sf'd "tati:.ti(~<; 
arc us ua lly 115(,(] to 1min morl., ls wit.h rall De t a il R e<'ord:o\ (CnH > Th(' ~xtmr.lt'd feat lin.>:; from 
d t!tt'l"·t anomAlous ndls t ha t a lread y exist in t he 1:a:.Li lig c!a t<\, Th(' dN.N·tion q \Ul lity of IU'\\' types 
of 1I1l0111aJ.ous ('a lls ('1\11 be (l \lf~l ilmen. 
/ behllviours into groups a nd lIsed kuuwlI d ilfpN':.! fmud ll('('IH\rio.. . Th<, Oa~'f'Si<1ll uctwork was 
not III II1N I from ('all rhna h ili in our rl'S('ll rch. wt- tully mil.Nt tI n ilidividuill rn.)(jl' i fWIll d,.ja. 
Iiullmt'li IlM,>d [. llaYIll'i. 1Il network dl.lh.<;i tio·~ dww:1 fro lll exp,(Tt kr:owledgt, Idth ;\ p r i(,r kllowled~e 
of k llOwu frS"m{! u l('rlt S('+'uarios. ThE~ appropriatcl:cs,> of thil> Illc!;,OO to dctectioi of Ilf'W anomalit-'S 
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2.2, PRJOR A,\'OMt\l..Y DETECTION A!'-D Y]()DELL1.I\:C; RESEAnrH 
APPLIED '1'0 DA YESHJ'l NETWOR1(S 
was not dearly stated whether thl'Y uS('{) real li fe v r ~enem:ed c~! 1 data Imt tl.cy propo:.ro. to ten. 
th('ir tIl('thl)l l OJ) mohik phr.np real-worlrl. s ize. 
UaY1..'llittll netwlJrks have been successfully applied ill llle<lici nE: to d i,lgnose di:scwses Ml{"h a!> pneu-
tnOllin. :40J , wid spoo:h r('Cognitio ll [(i(j:. il-lining B a.vcsian netw(.rk models fWIIl (hta h~ also been 
SllCCCSI>[U l.Iy flppli(,(j in SC"vcra.i applicn.tiom, [IC) h:\t fc ..... of slI,h Day~'sji\n network tecitnolo):,;y haV(' 
ht'Cll applied to ;.\'lecOlll1ll1ll1icatiollS call datu. Thi,> Ilmy probably be dtlt' to its cornpiltationn.] time 
or being /I new rl~carcl l art:>a, b ut ou r work illustrate» n. proof of conCi'pt 011 thr cApability of minin):'; 
BHypsian nPtwork, Ilnd () ')(, 11~ lip fllt.ure dirf'<:tioll to ielpruvC' t:li:uJlI-( sl)('l,'( l. This if' OllT new idea. 
DlstGllce-based 9IJomuly detection is describ<!<:1 in (2:. (:141. This wa. .. IllreM.\' d i."CI1.o;.scd in :-.ection 
Prvblem. Dcfj,"tlOrl.S, MohvalwlI,!> {HId Reseo.n;/; Que~tior~~ of Chl\~. t('r Oil\'. III this mpthod. an 
rocusc:. primarily 0n continuous p. tlr ibHI.t!b. Our ;'<.;1prIM,h tlifJ"pr'o t"ma l the i ~ as \\of! (,(\Illibo process 
lllix€(1 dA.tascts. 
other thnu l('h;:Ollllllullicatio!l~. [421 applicJ this :noc.d to iticLl i(v d iS('~' Out :HCaks by ~ tudyillg 
the :-'f, lc of O\"t'T-Th,,-Col\J)ter (OTe) drHbs in pharuHtcy ~hflp". Th" ir ah:,.,rilnlll nl'iitO:S a map 
of f\ lwiform rf'Ctangnlar [\"" x 1\ grid where each cell corr(~po nd~ to !I ,.,.:'urch rql,lO)IL 1\ ~earch is 
then cond\lcted along all !\.xis-aligned areas 011 :hc grid to find rcp:ionf' thAt hnxl' ~hown a r('Cpnt 
IIIlrJ!nallJllS ilwrf'a.'iI ' ill sn.les. The rl'gions t hat ~how high devill tioll 111 sales f:-om the estimated 
ba::,elin !'s ari' lall1'110r.i I\s alerts of OTe sales that may illdiratf' dic,f'a.'w qutbr .. ab. Thi~ is all 
absolll\R amtlysifl nwthod. whost' dfiC'if'llcy earlier researcher" .-:-' in te ]('("omJ11.lnication anomalies 
found Ill1C!>t.io)]l'I.bl~. 
In \·iew of all thl'S<' HIC'lhods a bove. we U~OO and propoSl.::d indiddl.la] modelling to :l\Cilit~~te anomaly 
uete<:tion sy~lRnL'l. T h{, Ilext sectioll imroduces tLe prior wvrk 01\ rnodelliug B,\yc:.ian nct.worb. 
2.2.2 Inlt'oductioll I() Pdol' "Vork on :\1()cif'lIiug Baypsian X c t work s 
We sttll li(.'d Hill-Clilllbillf, and consirler Genet ic al~CJr i t.hm8 iL tl.is r('!;Careh to modd Ba.\"csisll 
networks t llM we u:'('(1 to lIlonitor the behaviour of lciecoilimun ic.tion MI1JS('ril,..:s. We introdllcetl 
oV(>r "ix !"C!>l'a!"chcr~' prim work all lrlDdelli ll~ B<'.yesi;'\Il network:; <llId the dl,t<'.iled hackground OIl 
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2.3. CONCLUSION 
this Bayesian technology will be described in Chapter Three. 
Hill climbing algorithms are greedy score-based algorithms that continuously move uphill and may 
be terminated when there is no further learning improvement in the specific network structures. 
A new Max-Min hill-climbing method was developed by Ioannis [30] as a variant of hill-climbing 
algorithms. It was confirmed that some of the operators used for modelling in this technique do 
not provide any theoretical guarantee but this is a future direction. Also, Josep [33] developed an 
incremental hill-climbing method as a variant of standard hill-climbing to learn a Bayesian structure 
from data. In his work, he confirmed that the initial pattern of variables presented for modelling 
determines its output. It therefore implies that there can be a problem of generating several models 
as opposed to obtaining one optimal network. This sensitivity to variable ordering problem requires 
an improvement. This prior work is discussed further in the next chapter. 
A genetic algorithm (GA) is a stochastic search algorithm in which a large population of states is 
maintained where new states are generated by mutation and crossover processes [58]. Minimum 
Description Length Evolutionary Programming (MDLEP) was developed by Wai [67] to mine BN 
structures based on the MDL principle and on evolutionary programming. They developed three 
genetic operators which include: structure-guided mutation, knowledge-guided mutation, and freeze 
and defrost operators to mine Bayesian networks from data. Some of their operators can be 
combined to save modelling time. Larranaja [39] used a GA to generate variable orderings to 
evolve several networks during BN learning from complete data. His work is an alternative method 
of using GA to model networks from data. William [70] developed a genetic algorithm to solve the 
sensitivity to variable ordering problem encountered by Josep [33]. His work was like combining 
hill-climbing and GA. So, he hopes to use only GA to mine network in future research. 
In this research, we are motivated to use GA to model individual subscribers behaviour based on 
the satisfactory testimonies of these related researchers. Further information on these concepts of 
these techniques and their applications are described in Chapter Three. 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has expressed the existence of the problems in telecommunications anomalies, and its 
losses in both developed and underdeveloped countries. The strength and weakness of the prior 
research to combat the problems under investigation have been reviewed and related techniques of 
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2.3. CONCLUSION 
modelling Bayesian networks were introduced. 
The strength and limitations of different anomaly detection methods gave direction to the current 
research. As a result of this, the first step was to investigate fraud types and their relationships from 
the above literature references with the scientific methods of how they are committed. Moreover, 
the reasons (laxity) behind defrauding TSPs were reviewed in order to understand and assist call 
analysts in making decisions when they detect suspicious call records. 
A proposed solution for South Africa and the review of prior work in this field were presented 
in this chapter. The strengths and weaknesses of the prior work and the gap that this research 
covers were discussed. It became clear that anomaly detection may not prevent fraud from being 
committed by criminals but it helps the TSPs to understand where and when anomalies set in to 
their networks' data. When they understand these, then they can tighten their networks' security. 
This can frustrate the criminals and thereby minimise their fraudulent activities. 
The next chapter presents the relevant background required for this research. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Background 
3.1 Background on Probabilistic Modelling 
This section explains the necessary concepts of knowing the past, understanding the present and 
predicting the future using probabilistic modelling. It cuts across the concepts of Artificial Intelli-
gence, analysing Bayesian Network models, and related research in anomaly detection. 
3.1.1 Types of Artificial Intelligence 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a field of computer science that attempts to inculcate the intelligence 
of humans into a machine in order to solve problems. It is almost widely accepted that the two 
types of AI are strong and weak [50]. 
Strong AI is the creation of computer-based artificial intelligence that can reason and solve problems 
with self awareness. There has been no standard example of this yet, but strong AI assumes the 
human mind is software and the brain is purely hardware. Thus, the assumption is that a computer 
system can roughly approximate a human being, if it can include all the properties of human minds, 
such as consciousness. 
Weak AI is the creation of computer-based artificial intelligence that can reason and solve problems 
only in a limited domain; e.g. a probabilistic model applied to detect anomalous call records in the 
telecommunication domain. Other examples include pattern recognition, image processing, neural 
networks, robotics etc. 
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3.1. BACKGROUND ON PROBABILISTIC MODELLING 
A moderate level of progress has been made in weak AI [58], and this is viewed as the set of 
Computer Science problems without good solutions. We intend to make our own contribution to this 
field of study by using Bayesian Networks, as probabilistic models, to detect anomalous activities 
in telecommunication call records. This detection requires probabilistic reasoning with uncertain 
information. It primarily involves mining patterns from subscribers' behaviour together with the 
use of Bayesian inferences and differential analysis. The prediction of calls gives rise to degrees 
of beliefs that a call is regular or anomalous. This imposes a level of confidence (probability) on 
problem solving. The background on Bayesian networks will be reviewed in the next sections. 
3.1.2 Fundamentals of Probability Theory and Bayes' Theorem 
A Bayesian network represents a set of random variables and their causal interrelationships in a 
given problem domain. A Bayesian network requires discrete random values such that if there 
exists random variables Xl, ... , Xn with corresponding values Xl, ... , Xn then their joint probability 
is given by the term [53]: 
(3.1) 
The important properties of discrete probability distributions are as follows [53]: 
o ~ Pr(Xi ) ~ 1, where i = 1,2, ... n 
n 
LPr(Xi ) = 1 
i=l 
These basic properties are used in Bayesian networks, which are multivariate models that uses 
Bayes' theorem to solve complex problems like detecting anomalies in callers' records. For instance, 
to understand the solution to this expression, 
Pr(A call from 27720251590 = true I user's behaviour) =? 
we need to understand Bayes' theorem, which first requires the knowledge of conditional probability. 
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3.1. BACKGROUND ON PROBABILISTIC MODELLING 
The concept of conditional probabilities forms the basic building block of Bayes' theorem. For any 
two random variables Xi and Xj, the conditional probability of Xi given Xj is defined in equation 
3.2. 
(3.2) 
Using equation 3.2, together with the chain rule [50] of conditional probabilities, we have equation 
3.3. 
(3.3) 
The order of choosing Xi and Xj does not matter in equation 3.3, as in equation 3.4. 
(3.4) 
Now, if we equate the right hand sides of the equations 3.3 and 3.4, we have equation 3.5. 
(3.5) 
Thus, Bayes' theorem is given as equation 3.6. 
(3.6) 
From equation 3.6, Pr(Xi I Xj) is called the posterior probability. The posterior probability of Xi 
(the hypothesis) is obtained after making observations or studying the behaviour (Xj) of a user. It 
is the original degree of belief when the likelihood and prior are combined. 
Also, Pr(Xj I Xd is the likelihood function of Xi given Xj in the posterior. It is taken as the 
conditional probability of what we know (the evidence Xj) based on what we do not know (the 
hypothesis Xi). In other words, it is the probability of seeing the observation Xj given that the 
hypothesis Xi is true. 
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3.1. BACKGROUND ON PROBABILISTIC MODELLING 
In Bayes' theorem in equation 3.6, the prior probability of Xi, Pr(Xi), is the probability of Xi 
before making any observation or any inference. 
The marginal probability of Xj is mostly taken as a normalising constant and in expression 3.7, 
Pr(Xj I Xi) 
Pr(Xj ) (3.7) 
it is called the scaling factor because it gives a measure of the impact that observations have on the 
belief of the hypothesis. Supposing variable Xj has two values t and f in a dataset, the probability 
obtained by adding the joint probability of Xj = t without considering f, is marginal. A good 
example is shown in equation 3.21. 
3.1.3 The (In)dependencies in Bayesian Networks 
Formally, a Bayesian belief network is a directed acyclic graph represented in expression 3.8. 
G = {V(G), A(G)} (3.8) 
where V(G) implies expression 3.9, 
V(G) = {VI, ... , Vn}::::} vertices of graph G (3.9) 
and a set of arcs is described in expression 3.10, 
A(G) ~ V(G) x V(G) (3.10) 
All these represent the causalities or dependencies among the probabilistic variables. A parent 
variable refers to the cause while a child variable means the effect. 
Figure 3.1 shows the graphical representation of a Bayesian network model, which describes the 
qualitative knowledge about a particular domain. This probabilistic model gives an efficient de-
scription of multivariate probability densities. In our research, the nodes 
ni, where i = 1,2, ... ,6. 
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could represent anomaly indicators with the dependency relationships as arcs. The following con-
cepts will be continually used in the subsequent sections. 
Conditionally Dependent: In Figure 3.1, n5 is conditionally dependent on nl; we denote and 
compute the probability as: Pr(n5 I nl). Additionally, 
• n4 is conditionally dependent on nl and n2; we denote and compute the probability as: 
Pr(n4 I nl, n2), 
• n3 is conditionally dependent on n2; we denote and compute the probability as: Pr(n3 I n2), 
• n6 is conditionally dependent on n4 and n3; We denote and compute the probability as: 
Pr(n6 I n4, n3), 
Conditionally Independent: An evidence is a value that is seen or observed with certainty in 
real life. A node is said to be non-empty if it contains value. If n4 is a non-empty (evidence) node 
then n6 is conditionally independent of nl and n2. In other words, this means n6 does not depend 
on nl and n2 but only depend directly on n4. Also, the only path from n5 to n4 is blocked by node 
nl then, we say that n5 is d-separated (conditionally independent) from n4 [50]. Using Bayes' rule, 
we say that Pr(n5 I nl) is conditionally independent of Pr(n4 Inl' n2). In fact, this is an important 
property that the belief network exploits to reduce the number of probabilities to be computed as a 
model which makes intractable problems feasible. That is, the theory of conditional independence 
makes a child node to consider only its direct parent nodes when computing probabilities. 
Unconditionally Independent: A node is said to be empty if it does not contain a value or 
an evidence to propagate into other nodes. In Figure 3.1, suppose n2 is empty then, we say that 
n3 is unconditionally independent of n4. If n2 does not have an evidence to propagate into n4, 
this probably implies that n3 does not also propagate significant value into n2. That is, by Bayes' 
theorem, we can also say Pr(n4 I nl) is unconditionally independent of Pr(n3)' 
Joint Probability: A query node is a target node that we want to infer or whose probability 
we want to know. The joint probability of a model depends on what is expected in a query node 
given certain evidence. Using Bayes' theorem, the joint probability density distribution is defined 
in equation 3.11. 
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n 
Pr(Vl, ... , Vn ) = II Pr(ViI7f(Vi)) (3.11) 
i=l 
where 7f(Vi) represents a set of parent(s) of Vi. The joint probability distribution for the BN in 
Figure 3.1, is shown in equation 3.12. 
Conditional Probability Table (CPT): This is a form of table that contains the conditional 
probability distributions for discrete variables. Each row in a CPT contains the conditional prob-
ability of each node value for all the possible combinations of values for its parents. Each column 
must sum up to one [58]. Examples of CPTs are shown in figures 4.3 and 4.4, for some nodes on 
the Bayesian network in Figure 4.2. 
Pr(nl' n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) = Pr(nl)Pr(n2)Pr(n3 I n2)Pr(n4 I nl, n2)Pr(n5 I nl)Pr(n6 I n3, n4) 
(3.12) 
Figure 3.1: A Sample Bayesian Network Model 
3.1.4 Further Characteristics of Bayesian Networks and Learning 
Some important features of Bayesian networks apart from those mentioned in the previous two 
subsections are learning, probabilistic reasoning, level of confidence, and uncertainty. 
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Learning: The various scenarios in which Bayesian network learning can be applied are with 
known structures (models) with complete data (records), known structures with incomplete data, 
unknown structure with complete data, and unknown structures with incomplete data. The known 
structure implies supervised learning, while the unknown structure implies unsupervised learning. 
Our research intends to understand the behaviour of individual subscribers by mining (unsupervised 
learning) structures from call data. Bayesian networks are mined from training data and the results 
are depicted graphically as qualitative knowledge and quantitative knowledge is captured in the 
conditional probability tables (CPTs). 
Probabilistic reasoning: Causal (top down), Diagnostic (bottom up) and Explaining Away are 
the three patterns of reasoning observed in Bayesian networks [50]. 
The causal inference technique uses a cause to infer an effect. In other words, when a cause is 
observed, we can generate or predict the possible effects. For instance, from Figure 3.1, an example 
of causal inference is given by: Pr(n5 = true I nl = true). 
The diagnostic inference technique uses effects (or symptoms) as evidence to infer causes. It is 
normally used in expert systems. From Figure 3.1, an example of diagnostic inference is: Pr(nl = 
true I n5 = true). 
Explaining away is a reasoning technique where the change in belief is a possible explanation, if an 
alternative explanation is actually observed [50]. For instance, we may want to ask; what is the 
Pr(n4 I nl) and Pr(n4 I n6)? These two results can be explained to make better decisions. This 
type of reasoning is called Berkson's paradox [50], and it uses a causal reasoning step embedded 
within a diagnostic reasoning. 
In this research, almost all the observed nodes will be used as evidence nodes. These evidence 
nodes are used during reasoning as anomaly indicators in the subscribers' models, when detecting 
regular or anomalous calls. 
Any of these reasoning techniques can be used to detect abnormal patterns from callers' records. 
This decision depends on the hypotheses to be tested on the belief models we generate in this 
research. 
Level of confidence: The Bayesian network model uses a degree of belief, which is equivalent to 
probabilities, to express the confidence level of a result. For instance, if a Bayesian belief model 
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gives the output of a probability distribution about an entity such as: Pr( calling destination = 
true) = 0.92 and Pr(calling destination = false) = 0.08, we can then say that we have 92 % 
confidence that this is a regular call. 
Uncertainty: Bayesian network models are used to reason about uncertain information. Uncer-
tainty arises as a result of estimating from past (historical) and present behaviour to predict future 
behaviour. Uncertainty also arises when data is incomplete. 
Adaptive Systems: A system is said to be adaptive if it can adjust to its environment. The 
behaviour of telecommunication subscribers changes on an ongoing basis. We called a Bayesian 
network that models an individual subscriber's behaviours, a Behavioural Bayesian Network (BBN). 
We used BBNs to adapt to changes through incremental learning. 
Even though cycles can be included in some Bayesian networks [53], we do not consider cycles. This 
is beyond the scope of this research. In the next sections, we will discuss the differences between 
singly-connected and multiply-connected Bayesian networks but the next section states the theory 
of Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) and Parameter Learning. 
3.1.5 The Theory of Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) and Parameter 
Learning 
According to [58], the MLE is a reasonable approach to estimate probabilities for the parameters of 
a mined Bayesian network especially when a training dataset is large. It is a good approximation 
of Bayesian learning because it becomes difficult to prefer one parameter over another (biased) 
and, thus, uniform priors are assumed over all parameters. This is an unbiased estimate because it 
allows estimation to be driven by the dataset. 
Supposing there are two variables x and y in a dataset with values that sum to N. If the parameter 
of x represents the proportion or the probability as 'Y then, parameter of y = 1 - 'Y. Therefore, the 
likelihood of the dataset (d) with the required hypothesis (h) is given as follows [58]: 
Pr(dlh,) = 'Yx(1- 'Y)Y (3.13) 
The likelihood of h is given by the value of 'Y that maximises the log likelihood: 
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(3.14) 
The next equations 3.15 to 3.17, differentiate L w.r.t ,,!, and equate to zero to obtain the maximum 
likelihood estimate of "!; 
Since the differential of 
then, 
Therefore, 
1 
log,,! = -
"! 
x x 
"!=--=-
y+x N 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
This is the deduction of the instance counts which are sufficient statistics discussed by [46]. Hence, 
this formulates the basis of the quantitative knowledge of Bayesian learning that computes the 
MLE of Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) associated with each node of a Bayesian network. 
For the Bayesian learning, the CPTs are computed from the instances of training records and the 
conditional probability distribution of a BBN. For instance, Figure 4.2 shows the network of Dr 
Watson's grass. It has four nodes with two states each. The nodes are Cloudy(C), Sprinkler(S), 
Rainy(R) and Wetgrass(W) and the states are true(t) and false(f). The joint probability distribu-
tion is given in equation 3.18. 
Pr(C, S, R, W) = Pr(C) Pr(S I C) Pr(R I C) Pr(W I S, R) (3.18) 
The probabilities in each CPT are calculated such that all the node states are computed. For 
example, the knowledge of node C is calculated as marginal probabilities. Since C has two states t 
and f, then the probabilities are calculated in equations 3.19 and 3.20. 
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Pr C = t = #(Instances of C = t) 
( ) Total number of instances of C (3.19) 
Pr C = f = #(Instances of C = 1) 
( ) Total number of instances of C (3.20) 
These results are captured in the conditional probability table (CPT) associated with node C. Also, 
the conditional probabilities of node R given node C is calculated in equations 3.21 and 3.22. 
for all values of states t and f. 
#(Instances of R = t, C = t) 
#(Instances of C = t) 
(3.21) 
(3.22) 
Furthermore, the other probabilities in equation 3.18 are calculated in the same way. See Figures 
4.3 and 4.4 for the CPTs of Rainy and Sprinkler nodes. 
Having calculated the CPTs of the BBNs in our application, they are representations of the quan-
titative knowledge acquired from the call records about the behaviour of a particular phone user. 
Since learning is a continuous process, the BBNs are retrained on an ongoing basis. See incremen-
tal learning loop in Figure 4.1. The next section describes Bayesian inference as it is required for 
prediction in this research. 
3.1.6 Bayesian Inference 
After Bayesian parameter learning, the most important benefit of using Bayesian networks in real 
life applications is to carry out probabilistic inference. Bayesian inference is statistical inference 
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According to [8], absolute analysis in detection system is a fixed trigger system that raises an 
alert when anomalies are suspected in a dataset. Absolute analysis is more useful in the static 
world where patterns of operations are procedural, for instance, when analysing repairs of car 
faults or diagnosing diseases. It is therefore good at detecting extremes of fraudulent activities 
in telecommunications. In differential analysis, the trigger changes dynamically as the behaviour 
changes. 
Differential analysis can be used to monitor the behavioural patterns associated with every tele-
phone subscriber by studying his or her historical call activities. For example, a behavioural pattern 
detected as an anomalous call for subscriber X may be accepted as a regular call for subscriber Y. 
As subscribers' behaviours are representations of a dynamic world, absolute analysis would not be 
able to detect telecommunication anomalies and differential analysis is more appropriate for the 
implementation of the ADS presented herein. 
The next section describes the differences between singly and multiply-connected networks. 
3.1.8 Differences Between Singly and Multiply-connected Networks 
For singly-connected networks, there is only a single path between any two given nodes while there 
are more than one path between any two given nodes in multiply-connected networks. Figure 5.25 
shows a representative example of a singly connected network mined from VCI Irish data [49], using 
the Weka program [69]. Also, we present in Figure 5.26, a good example of a multiply-connected 
network that we mined, with the same Irish data, using our genetic algorithm (HGA). In Figure 
5.25, observe that there is only one path from sepallength to class while in Figure 5.26, there is 
more than one path from petallength to class. 
Exact inference works well on singly-connected networks while approximate inference performs 
better on multiply-connected networks [31]. More information is provided on their differences by 
Russel [58]. 
Our HGA has the ability to mine multiply-connected networks. Multiply-connected Bayesian net-
works are important to us in this research because one variable can easily influence many others 
via more than one path in a network that models subscriber's behaviour. 
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3.2 Bayesian Networks and Machine Learning 
Machine learning forms part of the field of AI. Russel [58] defines machine learning as the ability 
to adapt to new circumstances, to detect, and extrapolate patterns. A machine is said to learn 
whenever it gains knowledge, changes execution based on the information acquired in order to 
improve in its performance [50]. The field of machine learning that is applied in this research is 
computational intelligence. 
Computational intelligence is the study of adaptive mechanisms that exhibit an ability to learn or 
adapt to new situations, to generalise, abstract, discover and associate [18]. This describes numer-
ically based AI distinguished from symbolic AI. Some examples of machine learning studies used 
in computational intelligence mechanisms are discretization, inference, searching and optimisation 
algorithms such as using evolutionary algorithms for mining a Bayesian network. We researched 
and implemented some of these algorithms. 
3.2.1 Mining Bayesian Structures from Telecommunications' Data to Encode 
Knowledge 
We mine Bayesian network structures from data because it provides good knowledge models that 
can reveal the behaviour of a system [33]. Since historical data keeps track of every activity of a 
system, Bayesian networks can model this data, extract the hidden information and may even be 
able to explain the present to predict future activities. For instance, in a telecommunication system, 
the intention of phone users may not be known, but it is reflected in their call data. Therefore, 
the individual Bayesian network models that are mined from the data are good representations of 
the individual subscribers. Further reasons why the mining of Bayesian networks from data will be 
useful in anomaly detection include: 
• Knowledge is expensive to acquire and most of tile time, there are no experts to interpret 
environments or model a domain. Since data is cheap and has useful information about the 
environments, Bayesian networks can encode this hidden information as knowledge. 
• For many real world applications, Bayesian networks effectively capture and reveal the hidden 
patterns in datasets and encodes the patterns in form of graphical structures and conditional 
(in)dependencies [53], [50]. 
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• Bayesian networks (BNs) provide insight into knowledge discovered from data about a domain 
and it is capable of handling uncertainties [50]. Consider the subscribers' models in Figures 
5.1 to 5.17. Decisions about anomaly detection are being made despite the uncertainty 
about subscriber behaviours, and relationships between destination number and call duration 
attributes, relationships between destination network and location attributes etc. 
• During probabilistic learning, a BN can help to deal with hidden attributes and it can estimate 
missing data. 
• When the behaviour of a system is known or static, then it does not require the network to 
learn or extrapolate future behaviour from data. However, if it is dynamic such as subscriber 
behaviour and if behaviour cannot be pre-determined, then machine learning techniques are 
necessary. 
• Unlike with small datasets, when an organisational dataset is large, domain experts may find 
it difficult to manually build a Bayesian network model that can explain the activities in the 
data. A learnt model pattern from a given environmental state must be able to adapt to a 
changed environment in order to improve its intelligence. 
• Subscribers' models evolve on an ongoing basis. It can only be mined from data because 
subscribers' call information grows rapidly and their behaviour changes continually. 
3.2.2 Categories of Bayesian Learning 
We can describe Bayesian learning as the task of finding the best Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) 
that fits a training set of data, which results in qualitative and in quantitative knowledge stored 
in the Bayesian network. The qualitative knowledge is captured in the connection of nodes and 
the directed arcs. The directed arcs show causalities or dependencies among the nodes. The 
quantitative knowledge is captured in the Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) in the data. 
Both the DAG and CPTs can be learnt from training data. 
As stated earlier in the discussion of the characteristics of Bayesian networks, [50] and [46] classified 
Bayesian learning problems as follows: 
Known Structure and Complete Data: In addition to our reasons for learning Bayesian 
structures, when human experts come up with an appropriate network that represents a problem 
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domain, then we say that the structure is known. It is left to learn the Conditional Probability 
Tables (CPTs) using the known structure and a complete dataset. A suitable machine learning 
algorithm for the CPTs using observed data is the Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) [46]. 
Known Structure and Incomplete Data: By retaining the same meaning as in known struc-
tures above, incomplete data means that some data are missing in the training set. A solution to the 
partially observed data by machine learning algorithms is provided by the Expected Maximisation 
(EM) algorithm used to predict the missing values [50]. 
Unknown Structure and Complete Data: In addition to learning the CPTs for complete data, 
an unknown structure means that human experts cannot pre-determine the network that best fits a 
dataset. The solution is to search through the network space and use heuristic techniques to mine 
Bayesian structures from data. This is the case considered in this research. 
Unknown Structure and Incomplete Data: With the usual meanings retained from the above 
discussion, a solution to this problem is simply to combine the EM algorithm and the heuristic 
techniques to be discussed. 
Given this wide range of problem areas, we have decided to address only the problem of unknown 
structures and complete data in this research. 
3.2.3 Techniques of Mining Bayesian Structures from Data 
Mining Bayesian Networks from observed data is a machine learning application, which searches 
for a suitable structure that models a dataset. It is the first process of reasoning under conditions 
of uncertainty and it is often referred to as the discovery of causalities or dependencies in datasets 
[62] [54]. Many machine learning researchers have shown and accepted that, learning Bayesian 
Networks from data is an NP-hard problem [11]. NP-hard means finding a solution to a problem 
that runs in a Non-deterministic Polynomial time. 
We present a simple combinatorial analysis in Figure 3.2, which illustrates the complexity of network 
learning problems. It is a combinatorial problem because the use of the movement operators such 
as arc reversals and arc deletions can continue indefinitely. Arc reversal is changing the direction 
of an arc between two nodes while arc deletion is the removal of an arc between two nodes. 
Observe that there are infinitely many Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) solutions in X, if X = 
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details of hill-climbing because most advanced search and optimisation techniques use it as basis. 
Hill-climbing is popularly referred to as the K2 algorithm and it is characterised as follows in the 
next paragraphs according to [58] [22]. 
Common Characteristics of Hill-Climbing Algorithms 
The common characteristics of hill-climbing algorithms are; it learns structures very fast; it does 
not maintain a search tree or space; it keeps only the current state (network) and the objective 
function value (network goal). The network goal depends on the design, its implementation and is 
commonly reached by convergence; and it does not look ahead beyond the immediate neighbor of 
the current state. 
A schematic hill-climbing algorithm extracted from [45] and [58] is enumerated below. By definition, 
let model = state and goal model score = objective function value = minimum score. 
Schematic Hill-Climbing Algorithm 
1. Evaluate and score initial model 
2. if initial model score == goal model score then exit, 
else current model = initial model. 
3. Select a new operator to generate a new model. 
4. Evaluate and score the new model. 
5. if new model score < current model score then, current model = new model. 
6. if current model score ~ goal model score then exit, 
else repeat step 3. 
The commonly used operators are: addition, removal and reversal of arcs [50], [11], [30] as illustrated 
in Figure 3.2. They are specifically used to transform a current Bayesian Network to another during 
learning (see fig. 3.2). By definition, an edge addition operator is used to join two dependent 
nodes of a current network with an arc. An edge removal is used to delete an arc between two 
nodes, and it is normally used to break a cycle that was created in the current network. Also, an 
edge reversal is a transformation that requires a change of arc in the opposite direction between 
two nodes. Thus, the choice of an operator and the details of its mechanism differs from one 
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3.2. BAYESIAN NETWORKS AND MACHINE LEARNING 
3.2.5 Further Related Research on the Hill-Climbing Algorithms applied to 
Bayesian Networks 
The variants of hill-climbing research applied to many Bayesian network structures were investi-
gated in order to understand their strengths and weaknesses. 
Ioannis [30] presented a Max-Min hill-climbing method used to learn Bayesian Networks from data. 
They first reconstructed a skeleton of a Bayesian Network and then performed a Bayesian-scoring 
greedy hill-climbing search to orient the edges. The orientation of the edges used any of the hill-
climbing operators described earlier, and mathematical mechanisms were defined to choose the 
operators. Consequently, Ioannis stated that the orientation phase did not provide any theoretical 
guarantee but they hoped to improve on it in the future. 
Josep [33] proposed an incremental hill-climbing search to learn a Bayesian structure from data. He 
also combined the operators of K2 with an incremental search to improve on computational time. 
However, he explained that incremental hill-climbing algorithms are very sensitive to ordering 
effects. That is, when two sample orderings 0 1 and 02 of a training set are presented to the 
algorithm, it may output different domain models. This is a general research concern that must be 
avoided. 
To this end, the following are further characteristics of hill-climbing as identified and discussed in 
[45] and [36]. 
Further Characteristics of Hill-Climbing 
One characteristic of hill-climbing is its inability to backtrack. That is, to undo the action of an 
operator. This is as a result of its characteristic that it does not have memory. It is also trivial to 
program. 
Another one is that its movement set design is critical. With reference to Figure 3.2, the movement 
set is the choice of operators such as reversal and deletion of arcs. This is a result of large network 
space and nodes dependency problems. There is no universal pattern of choosing operators at each 
mining step. 
Also, if the number of moves with operators is enormous (e.g. in large datasets), the algorithm 
may be inefficient. Moreover, if the number of moves is small, the algorithm can get stuck easily. 
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3.2. BAYESIAN NETWORKS AND MACHINE LEARNING 
In view of the above, we conducted further research into advanced approaches (presented in the 
following section) to mine structures from data. 
3.2.6 Stochastic Techniques for Mining Bayesian Networks 
The optimisation techniques of mining structures that are recommended for the purposes of this 
research are Simulated Annealing (SA) and Genetic Algorithms (GA). They are stochastic in nature 
because the probability that they use to select successors, such as offspring, is an improving function 
that minimises the objective function value. The algorithms are described as follows: 
Simulated Annealing is an algorithm that combines hill-climbing with a random walk. The latter 
refers to a gradual movement to choose a new structure uniformly at random from a solution space 
of all possible networks. Although, the SA method has been proved in the literature to be better 
than hill-climbing, we are not motivated to use it to model telecommunication subscribers because: 
1. it has more positive testimonies in solving manufacturing scheduling optimization problems 
tha~ining structures [58]. 
2. there has been little academic research work done on its performance in mining Bayesian 
network structures. 
Hence, we decided to use the GA method. 
Genetic Algorithms 
A Genetic Algorithm (GA) is an evolutionary optimisation algorithm that solves problems by using 
the process of evolution [23]. Russel [58] describes a GA as a stochastic search algorithm in which a 
large popUlation of states is maintained. New states are generated by mutation and crossover, which 
combine pairs of states from the population. A GA elicits a natural selection whereby offspring 
populate the next generation according to the fitness of the parents. The following in the next 
paragraphs are characteristics of a GA according to Russel [58] and Moore [45]. 
Common Characteristics of Genetic Algorithms 
The characteristics of GA are as follows: it maintains a solution space or search tree (e.g. generated 
populations), it is computationally intensive because it takes a long time to run to completion during 
optimisation. Also, bitstring representation is critical in GA, if an application requires bits [45]. 
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A bit is either a 1 or a O. A bitstring is a sequence of O's or l's. An example of a bit string is 
"10011". An application that requires bits are more prone to errors that can arise from bitstring 
manipulation. 
Moreover, inner-loop optimisation is often possible [45]. This is to ensure decomposability of 
network components. In our research, we used inner-loop optimisation, which will be described in 
more detail later. 
Also, GA can crossover contiguous chunks of the bitstrings instead of random bits, and states used 
may not necessarily be bitstrings [45]. It could use strings over other finite alphabets. An alphabet 
is defined as a basic symbol in an application, such as a bit 1, 0 or letters a, b, c etc. 
A schematic GA as described and extracted from (Andrew Moore) [58] and [67] is as follows: 
Schematic Genetic Algorithm 
1. Identify initial population 
2. Evaluate initial population 
3. Generate a successive population 
(i) Parent selection 
4. Generate offspring through the genetic operators 
(ii) Crossover 
(iii) Mutation 
5. Evaluate the fitness and survival of individuals 
6. Repeat steps 3 - 5 until the solution space is exhausted. 
MOTIVATIONS FOR RESEARCHING GENETIC ALGORITHMS 
For the purposes of the current research, we are particularly interested in exploring GAs for the 
following reasons: 
1. Its intelligent characteristics can save a lot of programming efforts. That is, the implemen-
tation of crossover, mutation and fitness function is clear but may probably require more 
programming work with other search algorithms. 
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2. It has wider academic applicability, and positive testimonies exist from early researchers in 
mining Bayesian network structures. For instance, Larranaja [39] showed that a GA is very 
good for mining suitable DAGs from complete datasets. Also, Wai [67] demonstrated and 
showed that a GA is superior for discovering extremely good networks from large datasets. 
Moreover, Moore [45] and Russel [58] described the GA as one of the best optimisation algo-
rithms and as being highly versatile and useful for solving optimisation problems, specifically 
mining structures from data. 
3. A GA will eventually reveal the true hidden relationships in a dataset but the process may 
take a long time. 
Hence, we deduce from the above premises that a GA can reveal a true representation of under-
lying models in datasets more effectively than the greedy search methods. Prior to discussing the 
methodology used herein, it is necessary to include the following important fundamental definitions 
of GA terms, as acquired from the literature. 
Fundamental Definitions of Genetic Algorithm Terminologies 
1. A Population is a set of individuals. For instance in P = {{Xl}, {X2' X5}, {X6}, ... {Xn }}, P 
denotes a population. 
2. An Individual is represented as a string over a finite alphabet. For instance, {Xl}, {X2' X5} E 
P are individuals. In other words, X2 and X5 are alphabets or strings that are finite within the 
individual {X2,X5}. A form of string that is not an alphabet is a bitstring that was defined 
earlier. 
3. The Fitness Function is used to evaluate the fitness of individuals in candidate selection. 
That is, the capability of the individuals to survive the generation. For instance, the Minimum 
Description Length (MDL) is an example of a fitness function. More description is provided 
in Chapter Four. 
4. The Objective Function tries to find an optimal value for a fitness function. For instance, 
the objective function is to find the minimum network score, when mining Bayesian networks 
from data and when the MDL is used as the fitness function. 
5. Candidate Selection is the choice of individuals in the population that are fit to achieve 
the objective of a problem definition. For instance, Xl may be more probable to be the parent 
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of X2 while X2 may be less probable to be the parent of Xl. This is determined by the fitness 
function applied to BN structures. 
6. A Gene is an entity or a subset in an individual. For instance, the orders or directions of 
XI;X2 and X2;XI are separate genes of the individual {Xl, X2}' For instance, in this research, 
this means that, the measurement of dependency of X2 on Xl is different from the measurement 
of dependency when the mutation gives Xl depending on X2. 
7. Reproduction is the generation of offspring from parents. The common genetic operators 
such as crossover and mutation are used to carry out the reproduction process from one 
generation to another. The reproduction multiplies the population and therefore creates a 
solution space. An illustrative example will be shown in subsequent sections. 
8. Crossover is generally considered as the most important genetic operation. This refers to the 
process of creating a new individual (offspring) through the combination of genetic materials 
of two parents. For instance, let {Xl} and {X2} be parents in a network of population then, 
through crossover, they reproduce a new individual {Xl, xd. Also, see fig. 3.4 for a biological 
example. 
9. Mutation introduces new genetic material into an existing individual. Introduction of new 
genetic material in structure mining refers to change of order or direction of the gene (vari-
ables) (see gene description above). For instance, we can mutate Xl, X2 to become X2, Xl. 
Also, see fig. 3.4 for biological example. We can see from the left hand side of the mutation 
picture that, a chemical process acts on the genetic material and generates new genetic ma-
terial on the right side. However, observe that they maintain the same structure but different 
chemical constituents. 
In the next sections, we investigate how existing GA researchers applied these GA concepts to mine 
Bayesian structures. 
3.2.7 Further Related Research using Evolutionary Algorithms (EA) to Mine 
Bayesian Network Structures from Data 
Genetic algorithms are popular specialisations of evolutionary algorithms. Wai [67] developed the 
Minimum Description Length Evolutionary Programming (MDLEP) to mine BN structures based 
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3.2. BAYESIAN NETWORKS AND MACHINE LEARNING 
and defrost operators were used to identify and repair redundant nodes. That is, when there are 
several modifications to the network and there is no improvement, it prevents further changes on 
the network. This variant type of a GA is claimed to discover extremely good networks. Some of 
their operators can be combined to save time. 
Larranaja [39] used a GA to generate variable orderings that are representations of chromosomes. 
The variables evolved several networks during BN learning from complete data. They used genetic 
operators, such as rank selection to select parents for reproduction, crossover and mutation to 
generate new individuals. They showed in their experiments that a GA can discover good networks 
from data. There was no clarity, though, on how their results proved better than what they 
addressed in the literature survey of their paper. 
William [70] identified sensitivity to variable ordering as a shortcoming of most greedy score-based 
algorithms such as K2. Variable ordering is the combination of attributes to form nodes in Bayesian 
structure learning. When an algorithm is sensitive to ordering of network variables (A, B, C, D), 
it implies that the emerged optimal network of input pattern B, C, D, A will probably be different 
from input pattern D, A, C, B. They developed a genetic algorithm to mitigate this problem by 
searching the permutation space of variables using a fitness function. Specifically, William et al. 
used an order crossover (OX) to generate a population from six variable nodes. For instance, OX 
reproduces offsprings 
0 1 = {6 2 Q.ll 4} 
and 
02 = {5 3 Q2 4 I} 
from parents 
P1 = {3 4 Q2 1 5} 
and 
P2 = {4 1 Q.l2 6} 
Also, they implemented mutation as swapping of number positions as shown. Moreover, they refer 
to P1 , P2, 01 and O2 as individuals. However, they claimed that they have minimised part of the 
K2 limitations and therefore, proposed that their results have the potential to only use the GA to 
mine networks in future research. 
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It is interesting to note that a similar approach is used by Myers [48] who also made representations 
of GA elements and operators such as gene, crossover etc. They developed a variant of a genetic 
algorithm as described below. They illustrated structure mining with five variable nodes, where 
each node is represented as a gene and a network structure is represented as chromosome. Myers 
used uniform crossover and mutation as add, delete and reverse operators that are commonly used 
in K2 algorithms. They illustrated with two parents simultaneously as follows: 
Parents (PI and P2) ---+ 
PI = [{A}{B A} {C A} {D B C}{E C}], P2 [{A B} {B}{C B} {D B}{E CD}] 
0 1 = [{A} {B A} {C B} {D B C} {E CD}]' O2 = [{A B} {B} {C A} {D B} {E C}] 
These operators are used to modify the chromosome structure, but they are prone to cyclic struc-
tures. The improvement on what they used as genetic operators paves the way for future research. 
In the next section, we will describe the differences between the GA and the K2 algorithms. 
3.2.8 Common Differences Between Hill-climbing and Genetic Algorithms 
Similarly to hill-climbing, a genetic algorithm starts with an initial model, usually the worst model, 
that can iteratively be optimised to a goal model. Apart from this similarity, the following are the 
differences between the two approaches: 
• The number of iterations for a GA can be pre-estimated from the population size while it is 
determined at convergence point in the K2 algorithm. 
• The K2 does not generate a solution space because it does not have memory but grabs its 
neighbour. Unlike the K2, a GA has memory and generates populations using the genetic 
operators [58], [45]. 
• A GA is stochastic in candidate selection while K2 operators are greedy in their search 
approach [58]. 
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• The K2 is terminated when there is notice of convergence but this convergent point may be 
stuck at a local minimum [45], [58]. Unlike the K2, a GA runs into completion by exhausting 
the whole network space. 
• The K2 is fast with good models but a GA is computationally intensive with better models 
[70]. 
• When two sample orderings 0 1 and O2 of a training set are presented to the K2, it may 
output different models but a GA can take any ordering and will present the same model 
[70]. 
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we observed that anomaly detection in various datasets is a problem of reasoning 
with uncertainty. 
Probabilistic models (Bayesian Networks) provide the ideal technology to reason in the presence of 
uncertainty [53]. In this research, we use the Bayesian networks technology to detect the anomalies. 
This chapter has introduced the basic building blocks of probabilistic modelling, including: prob-
abilities, Bayes' theorem and reasoning techniques. In this research, we used Bayesian networks 
to model individual subscriber behaviour as cause-effect relationships, which we used to detect 
anomalies. We discussed the different categories of Bayesian learning. 
Our approach is to study the behaviour (call patterns) of every subscriber and to build an individual 
model in order to achieve effective anomaly detection. We have seen that mining Bayesian network 
structures from data is essential, especially for call data. We use a genetic algorithm (HGA) to 
mine BBNs for individual subscribers. The details of genetic algorithms and the motivations for 
choosing it for this research have been presented. 
To this end, we have reviewed the theories and background needed in the chapters that follow. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
Our first research question is, How can call data be observed and transformed so that the underlying 
models of individual subscribers can be mined efficiently? In order to address this research question, 
we propose the Data Transformation System (DTS) that transforms the data so that individual 
subscriber models can be mined effectively from the call data. One should recall that, anomalies 
in telecommunications call data are difficult to understand because it is necessary to discover the 
intentions of subscribers and to identify inconsistencies in calling behaviour. Such inconsistencies 
cannot be observed directly from subscribers' call data and we need machine learning algorithms 
that can discover and model the true calling activities of every subscriber. We therefore propose a 
new hybrid genetic algorithm (HGA) in order to reply to our second research question; How can 
optimal Bayesian network models be mined from telecommunications call records? 
We also propose the Anomaly Detection System (ADS), to detect anomalies from observed call 
data. This replies our last research question; How can Bayesian network models be used to detect 
anomalies in customers' behaviour? This thesis does not only apply machine intelligence algorithms 
to telecommunications industries but also contributes to machine learning algorithms, specifically 
for mining Bayesian network structures from data. 
The next section describes the methodology that we used in this research. 
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4.1. SYSTEM MODEL 
stations of a network service provider. A base station is a service station for a TSP. Furthermore, 
the central database contains both the historical and the current call transactions for all subscribers. 
In our prototype, we process our call data grouped into daily transactions. Daily calls are stored 
in the Current Call Dataset (CCD). Historical call data refers to calls made since first subscribing 
to the network, and is stored in the Historical Call Dataset (HCD). In future research, we aim to 
handle transactions per call in real time and not group them into days. 
The Data Transformation System (DTS) prepares the data for use by the rest of the system. It 
forms the pre-processing phase of this system. The HGA uses the data prepared by the DTS to 
mine an optimal Bayesian network (BBN) for each subscriber from the individual subscriber calls, 
contained in the HCD. 
The ADS uses Bayesian learning, Bayesian inference and differential analysis, which will be dis-
cussed in detail in the subsequent sections. During Bayesian learning, the ADS uses the HCD to 
train an evolved BBN from the HGA to populate CPTs. The ADS acts on a trained BBN to 
classify call records in the CCD for a given subscriber. Call data identified as regular is added to 
the HCD to incrementally train the BBN model, while the anomalous call alerts the call analysts 
to investigate. The anomalous calls can be finally confirmed by the TSP as regular or anomalous. 
If it is confirmed as regular, it will be included into the HCD for training. If it is confirmed as 
anomalous, then it is totally excluded from the training set. 
The addition of regular calls to the HCD is used to improve the accuracy of the BBN before the 
ADS acts upon it. The use of this incremental training is strongly encouraged to minimise error 
rates, commonly called false alarms. This incremental training causes the BBN models to evolve 
with the dynamic world of individual changing behaviours, which would not have been possible if 
the models were static. 
4.1.1 Data Acquisition and Data Understanding 
There are confidentiality issues that make it difficult to obtain telecommunication call data. For the 
purpose of studying telecommunication anomalies, we were able to acquire land line call data from a 
servicing firm to Telkom South Africa. This real life dataset is a good generalisation of networks that 
have mobile call data. It contains almost all the attributes expected in any telephone network. For 
instance, most of the attributes in Table 5.4 that we used in our land line data are also presented 
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in the mobile phone data used by Burge [8], Hollmen [28], Fawcett [19]. The identities of the 
subscribers were filtered out in order to protect the confidentiality of individual subscribers. One 
of the interesting advantages of this research is that we applied our proposed modelling technique 
(HGA) successfully to other applications [56] and it can therefore be applied to mobile networks 
with confidence. 
In order to conduct our call data analysis, we explored the use of a data analysis tool called SQLGate 
for the MySql database. This tool is used to generate structured datasets such as CSV (Comma 
Separated Variable), XML (Extensible Markup Language), database or text files, as required. Thus, 
any of these formats can serve as input specifications to a mining structure algorithm depending 
on requirements. 
We tried to ensure the universality of our architecture and also that our modelling design would 
be reproducible by using publicly available datasets to test our implementations. The common 
publicly available datasets are in the DCI repository [49], which most machine learning researchers 
use to learn and evaluate their networks. Among other datasets used for testing this research is 
the dataset containing the operations of a block-lifting machine [50]. 
During the data analysis phase, we identified the attributes of a Call Detail Record (CDR) in the 
call data. The call attributes are: {originating-no, call-date, duration, destination-no, destination-
net, location, call-cost, peak/off-peak, record-code}. How datasets and their attributes are acquired 
and observed for modelling are described in the next section. 
4.1.2 The Data Transformation Systems (DTS) 
It is known from knowledge discovery and data mining literature that data transformations can help 
to better understand the data that enters into machine learning algorithms [4). In this research, 
we packaged the required data transformation activities into a number of processing subsystems. 
The DTS is a decomposable system that observes and preprocesses call data for modelling and 
prediction. This system is general, not only limited to telecommunication data, and can therefore 
be used in other applications. One of the objectives of our DTS is to produce a suitable informative 
training dataset for the modelling architecture. This ensures a meaningful interpretation of patterns 
mined with the Bayesian networks. 
The DTS is a suite of three simple, interactive and cascaded subsystems, which include the filtering, 
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discretization and user-collection subsystems. For more detail on the designs, consult the class 
diagram in Figure A.I in Appendix A. 
The filtering subsystem receives telecommunication call data, processes the data and sends the 
results to the discretization subsystem, more specifically: 
• Fetches call data from the central database; 
• Reports the number of call records and attributes; 
• Reports the number of subscribers; 
• Reports subscribers' call data if required; 
• Ensures attribute names are self explanatory; 
• A voids initial possible overparameterisation by excluding unnecessary attributes; 
• Creates new attributes by automatically generating node names as one-to-one mapping to the 
original attribute names. This assists in taking care of long names, manage memory, avoid 
clumsiness and ensures confidentiality to call attribute names. 
The discretization subsystem uses the output of the filtering subsystem. Discretization applied 
to numerical attributes is well known to statisticians and other machine learning researchers. The 
equal width algorithm is an unsupervised discretization algorithm that is very suitable to anomaly 
detection [4], [9]. It divides data sets into intervals of equal width and the widths of the intervals 
depend on the patterns of the available data values, producing an informative telecommunication 
dataset in our case. The functionalities of the discretization subsystem are as follows: 
• For simplicity, it discretises the number of attributes depending on user specifications. Our 
implementation accepts numerical attributes as nominals, except if the user specifies it to be 
discretized. 
• It generates a default number of intervals but allows flexibility. That is, a user can specify the 
desired number of intervals as an alternative to the unsupervised generated default intervals. 
• It automatically identifies date attributes and generates the corresponding days of the week. 
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• During discretization, the generated intervals maintain the data types, e.g. integer inputs 
will be discretized as integer intervals, etc. 
We identified and implemented the equal-width algorithm [24] as follows: 
Pseudo-code for Equal-Width Discretization Algorithm 
Inputs: (i) Xli], N, C, (n) 
(ii) Default n: max(Mj3C, min(C+1, M)) 
Comments: n = desired number of intervals, M = Number of distinct elements in Xli], C = number 
of classes in the input set, N = Number of points, and Xli] = column elements to be discretized. 
1. Find the minimum value Xmin and the maximum value Xmax of Xli], i = 1, ... , N 
2. IntervalWidth = (Xmax - Xmin)jn 
3. For r = 0 to n 
err] = Xmin + IntervalWidth * r 
Outputs e[O:n]: Vectors of discretized boundaries. That is, discretized intervals such as: 
The user-collection subsystem receives the output of the discretization subsystem and collects 
data for individual users using the originating call numbers. Every subscriber will have a subset of 
the RCD and a subset of the CCD data. The RCD subset serves as the training data for the RGA 
to mine an individual Bayesian model (BBN), while the CCD subset is used as the query data by 
the ADS. The user-collection subsystem performs the following activities: 
• Among all the call attributes in the central database, RCD and CCD subsets are collected 
using subscribers' originating call numbers as key. 
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ALGORITHM (HGA) 
• Collection is performed in batch or on only one originating call number. That is, we may 
want to generate CCD and HCD subsets of only one subscriber at a time or generate CCD 
and HCD subsets for all subscribers. 
• Originating call numbers are automatically deleted from the training set because it does not 
contribute information to relationship discovery during modelling, as it is the same for all 
call records for the same subscriber. 
• In general, for other datasets, apart from call data, if a user does not specify the inclusion of 
originating call numbers, then all attributes are included in the training set. 
• It introduces incremental learning by loading summarised statistics of distinct values found 
on all attributes of a user collection. This helps to speed up modelling. 
On completion of all activities of the DTS, the final informative CCD and HCD subsets are gener-
ated for use by the rest of the system. 
4.2 Bayesian Modelling and the Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA) 
To facilitate the modelling of multiply-connected Bayesian network structures, we propose new 
technique called a Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA). This does not only adopt the classical GA 
operators but also integrates information theoretic measures as learning components and mathe-
matical concepts as population constructions. Specifically, the information theoretic measures that 
we used include: Mutual Information (MI), Shannon's information content, and Minimum Descrip-
tion Length (MDL) (see next sections). Mutual information is a model that finds the probability 
that two variables share information. The mathematical component part of the HGA is the Pow-
erSet lattice, which implements the crossover operator. Moreover, the PowerSet lattice generates a 
population space from which the best networks can emerge. 
The classical GA is a framework or generalisation of HGA. The initiative used to research and 
reconstruct some of these models (e.g. EDA, PowerSet, etc) to achieve the fundamental function-
alities or elements of GA is the power of HGA. The classical GA such as the pseudocode shown in 
the next section is a framework [18] whose operators such as crossover, mutation, and optimization 
processes are required to be redefined. As Russel [58] supports the variants of algorithms, any 
55 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
4.2. BAYESIAN MODELLING AND THE HYBRID GENETIC 
ALGORITHM (HGA) 
algorithm that is a framework cannot be implemented directly but it must be reconstructed to be 
operational. The development of HGA is a new idea as part of our methodology to modify and 
experiment models (e.g. EDA, MDL, PowerSet, etc) from various fields of information theory and 
mathematical set theory to redefine the operators of classical GA. 
Moreover, related algorithms were developed from the frameworks of classical GA and even hill-
climbing algorithms. As described earlier, Wai [67] developed the Minimum Description Length 
Evolutionary Programming (MDLEP) algorithm using the MDL principle and evolutionary pro-
gramming as a variant of classical GA. Similarly, Ioannis [30] developed a Max-Min hill-climbing 
(MMHC) algorithm that uses some mathematical operators as a variant of classical hill-climbing 
algorithm. 
One of the interesting features of this methodology is that, the components of the HGA are im-
plemented as decomposable systems. This decomposability means that the functionalities of every 
component such as the MI, perceives their inputs and produce their outputs differently from other 
HGA components. Furthermore, decomposability makes this algorithm ideally suited to be imple-
mented using distributed agents. In the next section, we describe the HGA in more detail. 
4.2.1 Pseudocode for Genetic Algorithm 
In order to give better direction to our implementation, and in order to incorporate the schematic 
genetic algorithm in the literature review, we extracted the following pseudocode of a GA from [18] 
and [58]: 
Pseudo-code for Genetic Algorithms 
1. Let 9 = 0 be the generation counter 
2. Initialise a population Cg of N individuals; Cg = {Cg,n I n 1, ... ,N} 
3. While no convergence 
• Evaluate the fitness of each individual Cg,n E Cg 
• Perform cross-over 
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1. Select two individuals 09,1 and 09,2 
2. Produce offsprings from 09,1 and Og,2 
• Perform mutation 
1. Select one individual Og,n 
2. mutate Og,n 
• Select the new generation Cg+1 
Crossover is generally considered as the most important genetic operation, which is the process of 
creating a new individual by combining the genetic materials of two parents. Similarly to crossover, 
mutation introduces new genetic material into an existing individual. 
The development of these genetic operators depend on their applications. 
The definitions of GA terms in our literature review give better understanding to the GA pseudo-
code above. An iterative scheme, when applied to mining Bayesian network structure from data, 
converges when the candidate network with the best fitness emerges. 
Looking at steps one and two in the pseudo-code above, the initial population of N individuals 
corresponds to the attributes of a training set. That is, the generation Cg where g = 0, represents 
the parents in the form of vectors. From step three, we evaluate the fitness of each individual, 
and score each variable Og,n in the generation Cg. In the crossover step, two individual variables 
09,1 and 09,2 are selected from the parent set and combined to produce a new subset of variables. 
This new subset is referred to as the offspring. Also, selecting an individual Og,n for mutation 
means changing the genetic material of an offspring. This implies changing the order or direction 
of elements in subsets. However, this is not noticeable or relevant to us in so-called singleton sets. 
In the set theory of mathematics, a singleton set is an individual with only one variable. 
In view of this, selection of individuals for reproduction and fitness of the network model is stochastic 
(probabilistic). In the following sections, we describe how we applied genetic algorithms in our 
research. 
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4.2.2 Mining Bayesian Network Structure using the HGA 
By maintaining the usual meanings of the G A terms and considering the pseudocode above, the 
HGA methodology that we used to mine Bayesian network structures is described as follows: 
The HGA mining begins with an initial population P, say {{Xl}, {X2}, {X3}, {X4}} called parents, 
and of which the independent network: (xl), (x2), (x3), (x4) is formed. Every parent in the initial 
network is evaluated with the MDL model scoring measure (see subsequent sections; Approach: 
Minimum Description Length (MDL)). Every parent in P such as {Xl} produces offspring during 
several crossover processes with other parents such as {X2}, {X3}, {X4}. The mathematical Poset 
lattice (see subsequent section; Mathematical PowerSet Lattice) implements this crossover process 
and is advantageous to our network space because it guards against cyclicity, which we do not allow 
in this research. 
Furthermore, we implemented a network checker that confirms the absence of the cycles. There 
is an equiprobable selection of every other parent for producing a child subset. This means that 
the probability of producing offspring from a pair of parents is 0.25 each for the above initial 
population. To avoid backtracking, to avoid worse scoring structure or to avoid time wastage in 
evaluating an entire candidate network structure using MDL, we introduced an inner loop by using 
MI (see subsequent sections; Approach: Mutual Information (MI)) to check if an offspring produced 
is probabilistically fit as a candidate sub-structure in the entire Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). 
For every new offspring produced that survived, such as {Xl, X2}, the prior probability that {xI} or 
{X2} is a parent of each other, is 0.5 respectively. Since they are equiprobable, it becomes difficult 
to decide which should be the parent. So, a new offspring {X2' Xl} is produced using the EDA 
(see subsequent sections; Approach: Extended Dependency Analysis (EDA)) by mutating {Xl, X2}. 
There is also equal prior probability 0.5 of {X2} or {xI} being a parent of each other. It is also 
difficult to decide between the two. Therefore, these two different individuals will respectively 
formulate candidate sub-networks. 
In order to decide which attribute is the parent, the two candidate sub-networks compete with 
each other and the winning candidate sub-network will emerge. This means that a more fitting 
candidate sub-network will serve as a building block to the entire DAG. The selection of a more 
fitting candidate sub-network is guided by Shannon's information content (see subsequent sections; 
Approach: Extended Dependency Analysis (EDA)) in which the EDA decides and chooses a candi-
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date sub-network that will minimise the score of the DAG. This optimization process is repeated 
until the whole solution space is exploited and the best Bayesian network model emerges. 
The new generations of individuals can be produced from the current generation of offspring such 
as { {Xl, X2}, {XI, X3}, {Xl, X4}, ... , {X3, X4}}. In contrast to this, one of the distinguishing features of 
our methodology is that we control the new generation of individuals to avoid repetition of already 
existing individuals. The larger subsets of individuals will be broken down into smaller ones at the 
mining stage. Since the possible smaller subsets of individuals are produced in the older generations, 
we observed that less time may be wasted if the reproduction of newer generations is controlled. 
Given the above, our structure mining methodology is a variant of the classical genetic algorithm 
covered in existing research on genetic algorithms. 
4.2.3 The Proposed Architecture for the Hybrid Genetic Algorithm 
The HGA uses the output of the DTS, and consists of five subsystems namely, the PowerSetLattice, 
the HGA, the fitness function (scoring), the EDA, and the MI. The training set can be presented 
in XML, as a database file, a CSV or text file formats as required. In our implementation, a text 
file serves as input to the PowerSetLattice and the HGA subsystems. Furthermore, the HGA uses 
the scoring subsystem, which can be implemented by using a Bayesian method, MDL or Maximum 
A Posteriori (MAP). MAP [58] is a statistical learning method that can be used to estimate an 
unknown variable from a scientific data. MAP is similar to maximum likelihood (ML) but it 
includes a prior knowledge on the unknown variable to be estimated. We used the MDL in our 
implementation. 
As shown in the implementation design in Figure A.2 in Appendix A, the PowerSetLattice 
subsystem implements the crossover process using data attributes. The functionalities are stated 
below: 
• It extracts attribute names as input to the initial population. 
• It prepares the parents as a set and generates ordered sub-sets of offspring on equal proba-
bilities. 
• It releases the sub-sets of offspring on request to the HGA and keeps maintaining the popu-
lation as it grows. 
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The Hybrid-Genetic-Algorithm subsystem is the coordination subsystem that controls the 
other subsystems including, the PowerSetLattice, scoring subsystem, the EDA subsystem, and 
evolves the best Bayesian network models for individual subscribers. Its functionalities are high-
lighted as follows: 
• The HGA starts by requesting the parents set from the PowerSetlattice subsystem and pre-
pares the attributes as independent nodes of an initial network. 
• It gets the corresponding data for the attributes received from the PowerSetLattice sub-
system. 
• It sends both the initial network and its data to the scoring sub-system that uses the MDL 
for evaluation and remembers the score. 
• For the purpose of optimization, the HGA randomly requests a offspring sub-set from the 
PowerSetlattice and sends it to EDA to calculate its fitness. 
• If the offspring is fit, the HGA sends the initial network and the offspring sub-set to the MDL 
for evaluating the new network. The new network score result optimizes the initial network 
score. 
• For the purpose of monitoring possible overparameterization, which is generally a problem 
of large networks, the HGA carries out a pruning process. The pruning keeps the number of 
parents of a network node at k-value [11]. 
• The HGA ensures that the solution space, generated by crossover and mutation processes, is 
exploited by searching the entire network space in order to emerge the best structure. 
The EDA subsystem is used to check the fitness of offspring sub-sets received from the HGA 
subsystem. That is, it performs a dependency analysis of sub-set attributes. The functionalities 
are as follows: 
• It receives an offspring sub-set from the HGA and uses it to find the probability associated 
with its fitness as a candidate sub-network. 
• It uses the MI as an inner loop to first find the probability that the two attributes of the 
sub-set share significant information. 
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• If the probability of information sharing is significant, the EDA forms a candidate sub-network 
from the two attributes of the sub-set, mutates the sub-set and uses Shannon's information 
content to evaluate the two candidate sub-networks. 
• From the fitness competition, the wining candidate sub-network emerges and it is sent back 
to the HGA. 
The MI subsystem is the innermost loop that is used by our HGA to find the probability that 
two attributes of a offspring sub-set share information. We observed from our implementation that 
the probabilities of two attributes sharing information are commutative. That is, they are equal. 
The MI performs the following functions: 
• It receives the offspring sub-set from the EDA. 
• It computes the probability of information sharing between the attributes of the sub-set and 
gives feedback to the EDA subsystem. 
4.2.4 The Mathematical PowerSet Lattice used by HGA 
In mathematical set theory, if S is a finite set, then the Power Set of S represented as Pw(S), is the 
set of all subsets of S. It is a formalised concept of ordering or arranging elements of a set. The 
magnitude of a set S, is the number of elements in the set. Suppose the cardinality or magnitude 
of 11811 = n elements then, the PowerSet of S implies 
Pw(8) = 2n subsets 
For instance, if set 8 = {xl, x2, x3}, then the PowerSet of S implies 
Pw(8) = {{}, {xl}, {x2}, {x3}, {xl, x2}, {xl, x3}, {x2, x3}, {xl, x2, x3}} 
This is an algebraic concept that we use to generate populations of the HGA. The individuals of 
the initial population 8 = {xl, x2, x3}, are referred to as parents which reproduce offspring (the 
subsets of Pw(S)). This population of parents are modified via crossover and mutation processes, 
which elicit sexual reproduction and natural adaptation. 
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4.2.5 HGA Approach: Mutual Information (MI) 
In probability and information theory, Mutual Information (MI) [23] [32] is an intelligent model 
that measures information of a random variable X found in a random variable Y. That is, a measure 
of the amount of information sharing between two nodes of a network. Its unit of measurement is 
a bit and the model is given below: 
~ Pr(x,y) 
J(X, Y) = L..J Pr(x, y) x log2 Pr(x)Pr(y) 
X,Y 
( 4.1) 
where, Pr(x, y) = joint probability distribution of x and y while Pr(x) and Pr(y) are the marginal 
probabilities of x and y respectively. We observe that MI has been applied in many areas of machine 
learning. Some of its important properties are stated below. 
Properties of Mutual Information 
• MI performs better on probabilistic related variables. 
• J(X, Y) = J(Y, X). This implies that, MI is commutative or symmetric. 
• J(X, Y) ~ 0 
Suppose X and Yare independent, then X contains no information about Y and neither does Y 
contain information about X. Therefore, their mutual information will be zero. This is obvious in 
the relation below: 
1 Pr(x, y) 
og -P-r ("-x"'-) P';"':r'-'-(y"""') 
= log 1 = 0 
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Thus, MI is a measure of independence such that 
I(X, Y) = 0, iff X and Y 
are independent random variables. This implies that, 
J(X, Y) > 0, iff X and Y 
are dependent (i. e. shares information). 
4.2.6 HGA Approach: Extended Dependency Analysis (EDA) 
The original Extended Dependency Analysis (EDA) is a reconstruct ability analysis technique that 
evaluates the level of significance that exists between variables of a training set [61]. The level 
of significance between two given attributes is determined by their information sharing and the 
link threshold. More information on link threshold is described in the performance evaluation of 
HGA in Chapter Five. In addition to the original EDA, our methodology includes the mutation 
process of the genetic algorithm to reproduce a new candidate sub-network; it furthermore finds 
the dependency between the two variables using the theorem of Shannon Information Content [41], 
and produces the wining candidate sub-network. 
It receives a offspring sub-set from the HGA and produces a candidate sub-network. It passes 
candidates of not more than two variables at a time to the MI. 
Shannon defines information content as a natural measure of an outcome x as: 
1 
h(x) = 10g2 Pr(x) 
So, for all possible outcomes of x, the information content is defined as: 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
It is measured in bits. The smallest number of bits possible to store the information of x effectively 
is used. For example, the information content represented using 67.51 bits is preferred to using 
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98.31 bits to represent the same information. 
4.2.7 HGA Approach: Minimum Description Length (MDL) 
One of the important components that ensures that a GA is robust is its fitness function, which in 
our research measures the optimality of a candidate network (Bayesian network). The Minimum 
Description Length (MDL) is suitable for measuring the fitness of Bayesian networks as models 
of datasets [50]. We use an objective function based on the MDL to minimise the number of bits 
required to store a dataset and its corresponding Bayesian Network. Our HGA iteratively invokes 
the MDL until the minimum score is obtained. In principle, the MDL is made up of two two 
components as follows: 
L(D, B) (4.4) 
where D = training dataset, 
L = length of bits required to store both the dataset and its corresponding network. 
IBI = number of parameters in B, defined as: 
N 
B = 2:(ji - 1)ki (4.5) 
i=l 
where ji and ki are the cardinalities of the child node and its parents set respectively. Also N = 
number of all nodes in a network, m = number of samples and log~ m = number of bits that are 
appropriate to represent each numeric parameter. Recall that, a candidate network is the network 
presented to MDL for scoring. Also, Pr( Vi) = probability of a sample of D. This is computed for 
all values of {i, ... , m}. That is; 
Pr(D) = Pr(vi, ....... vm ) (4.6) 
Note that, P(Vi) is a probability distribution computed using a candidate network. 
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Therefore, the first component (information content) generative 
measures the required length, in bits, to store the dataset only and the second component 
IBIlog2 m 
2 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
measures the required length, in bits, to store the network model. Thus, equations 4.7 and 4.8 are 
added to give the MDL scoring measure for the optimal network. 
4.2.8 Potential Benefits of the Modelling Architecture 
The following in the next paragraphs are the potential benefits of our modelling architecture. 
Most of the previous researches use one operator for crossover and another to guide against cycles 
respectively [67]. In order to save space and time, a mathematical Poset lattice is used here to 
implement the crossover process and partly guides against cycles. 
Another benefit is that our system is not restricted by datasets types. Unlike most existing systems 
that can only mine networks from mixed or nominal datasets, our system can mine networks from 
datasets that contain numerical values that are not discretized into intervals. 
One of the distinguishing features of this methodology is that, the new generation of individuals 
is controlled to avoid repetition of already existing individuals. This saves time during the mining 
phase. 
Another important benefit is that our HGA implementation is not terminated by convergence, but 
terminates when the solution space is exhausted. During convergence, other methods may become 
stuck at a local minimum [58]. 
The other benefits are: the use of MI as an inner loop helps to ensure that the probability of an 
optimized new candidate network score does not get worse. This saves time. Also, our system is a 
general application, and has been successfully applied in other applications [56]. In addition, our 
HGA can mine multiply-connected networks. 
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In the next sections, we will discuss how we use our system to detect anomalies. 
4.3 Behavioural Bayesian Networks (BBNs) and the Anomaly De-
tection System (ADS) 
Up to this point, we have shown and described the methodology that we use to model individual 
subscribers' BBNs. The ADS uses the individual BBNs to understand current call data from historic 
call data, modelled by the BBNs, and to identify regular and anomalous calls in the current call 
data. This section presents the investigation results with respect to the last research question of 
this thesis. 
Consider the following scenarios that we studied as a basis for the ADS: 
• It becomes clear in BBN models that the phone calls of a subscriber Sl are clearly different 
from subscriber S2. For instance, Sl can make international calls regularly, but S2 can make 
them once in a while. 
• If Sl makes several international calls from January to March, stops doing so in April-June 
and later makes this type of call once after June, does this mean that it could be a fraudulent 
activity? 
• If S2 makes local calls to location A every first week of the month and makes a similar local 
call to location A or a new location B at the end of a particular month after many years, is 
this a fraudulent activity? 
• Consider the synthetic historical call data in Table 4.1. Will a high or small number of call 
instances, such as 54 in row 1 and 1 instance in row 2 respectively, influence the prediction 
of a similar call instance to be either anomalous or regular? 
• Also, will a new call instance that has not been observed in the history of calls, as in Table 
4.1, be predicted as anomalous or regular? 
It is obvious from the above scenarios that a constant threshold for all subscribers will not be 
able to detect anomalies. Therefore, these diverse scenarios and other unforeseen dynamic situa-
tions necessitate the use of differential analysis. We implement the ADS model using the following 
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Table 4.1: An illustrative synthetic historical call data for originating number: 27216861776 
Destination number Location Duration Peak / Off-peak N umber of instances 
27216850231 > 50km 120 p 54 
27216850231 > 50km 120 x 1 
27216850231 < 50km 120 p 7 
27216850231 < 50km 120 x 27 
27767343614 > 50km 120 p 3 
27767343614 < 50km 120 x 2 
27767343614 < 50km 60 p 4 
27767343614 < 50km 60 x 2 
components: [i] Bayesian learning and Sampling from Database, [ii] Bayesian Inference, [iii] Call 
Detection and [iv] Degree of Detection. These components are described in the subsequent sections. 
First, though, Chapter Three describes the computation of BBN model parameters as a deriva-
tion from the Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE). The probability values of Bayesian learning 
parameters must be estimated prior to inferences. The genetic algorithm mines Bayesian network 
structures from data. These BBNs are then used by the ADS during Bayesian learning. 
4.3.1 Example of Bayesian Inference Describing Prediction as Related to Our 
Methodology 
[31] and [58] have identified exact Bayesian inference to be tractable to small networks. That 
is, exact inference is NP-hard due to its exponential complexities of space and time on multiply 
connected networks. Fortunately, approximate Bayesian inference can be identified as a replacement 
to query multiply connected networks, which is used in this thesis. The BucketTree algorithm is an 
example of an approximate inference algorithm implemented in JavaBayes [13]. We embedded the 
BucketTree inference engine of JavaBayes in our implementations. JavaBayes [13] is open source 
software for probabilistic reasoning. Examples of probabilistic reasoning using this inference engine 
will be illustrated by using the popular Dr Watson's grass example of a Bayesian network in Figure 
4.2. 
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4.3. BEHAVIOURAL BAYESIAN NETWORKS (BBNS) AND THE 
ANOMALY DETECTION SYSTEM (ADS) 
Also, in the implementation of our ADS, the BBN is trained by computing its CPT using the 
training set (see previous sections for the computations of CPTs in Bayesian learning). 
Call Prediction: Call prediction represented as piN (e') is the probability of E = e inferred 
from the Bayesian network. This is computed using the Bayesian inference engine of JavaBayes 
embedded in our ADS implementation. Recall that for every subscriber, the prediction of calls in 
CCD is a daily transaction. 
Call Detection: Call detection is the decision making aspect of our ADS using the computed 
sampled and inferred probabilities. As a scientific test / decision, this step suspects that a phone call 
record is either regular or anomalous. From our empirical test and the results of our investigation, 
we therefore define call detection as follows: 
Pr~N (e) >= Pr~ (e') ~ Regular Call Suspected 
That is, if the inferred probability is greater or equal to the sampled probability, then regular calls 
may be suspected. If the inferred probability is less than the sampled probability, then, we can 
suspect the phone call to be anomalous. That is: 
Pr~N (e') < Pr~ (e) ~ Anomaly Call Suspected 
Automatic detection of anomalous calls can reduce workload of telecommunications service providers. 
However, this ADS is very helpful to them when a subscriber does complain of having received and 
paid for call bills that were not incurred. The service providers can easily confirm by using the ADS 
if such calls in the bill were truly anomalous or regular to ensure customer satisfaction. Regular 
implies that it follows the historical call patterns behaviour of the subscriber, while anomalous 
means it does not. To this end, how do we compute the level of confidence when making decisions 
about such calls? 
Degrees of Detection: Degrees of detection refers to the level of beliefs with regard to the call 
detection decisions. This result is expressed as a percentage and it will help call analysts and 
managers to make final decisions. A deviation below the sample probability is computed as follows: 
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4.4. IDENTIFICATION OF ANOMALY INDICATORS 
( 4.14) 
A deviation above the sample probability is computed as: 
BN :=: 
( IPrE (e) - PrE (e)1 O)CJ1 CJ1 Pr~N (e') x 1 0 10 = X.XX/O (4.15) 
This is analogous to the computation of percentage errors in mathematics. Equations 4.14 and 4.15 
are interesting because they support the concept of adaptive intelligence with their changing inputs. 
That is, the outputs use differential analysis due to their regular update in input values. We want 
to say that, we are X.XX % sure that a call is anomalous or regular. Thus, the implementation 
of the ADS results is shown in Chapter Five of this thesis. For more detail on the ADS design, 
consult the class diagram in Figure A.3 in Appendix A. The next section describes how indicators 
can be identified for use in ADS. 
4.4 Identification of Anomaly Indicators 
This section describes our methodology on how we identified anomaly indicators (the most inter-
esting attributes) in our mined networks. Burge [8] defined the meanings and classified anomaly 
indicators as primary and secondary, but he could not give specific examples. As one of our con-
tributions, we improved on these definitions and applied it to Bayesian networks. 
As discussed in Chapter One and Two, recent studies have investigated the challenges of anomaly 
detection but have not given conclusive solutions to address this problem. In this research, we infer 
that if appropriate anomaly indicators for individual subscribers are used for detection, the true 
positive rates of anomaly detection approaches can be maximized, while the false alarms can be 
minimized. One of our primary objectives was to identify significant or interesting attributes to 
make anomaly detection techniques effective. 
Having analyzed the Bayesian modelling of subscriber behaviour and having used the theories of 
causalities [53], we derived a qualitative measure for computing the most significant nodes (indica-
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4.4. IDENTIFICATION OF ANOMALY INDICATORS 
tors) in the mined networks. Similarly to Jaroszewick [31] work, we defined the most significant of 
all nodes in a mined network as in equation 4.16. 
n 
Max(Vk) = L Cj + [c], 'Ii Vk E G 
j=l 
(4.16) 
where c is the number of causalities for every node in the network G. Also, the [c] is optional, when 
two node measures are equal, and it depicts the number of independencies that may be caused by 
the removal of the node. Some of the related efforts to identify interesting nodes can be found in 
[31], but they mostly rely on prior knowledge of domain experts. H wever, the knowledge of the 
telecommunications domain expert may fail due to their inability to update knowledge about the 
current trends in the telecommunication calls and also due to large datasets. 
With reference to equation 4.16, the most significant node is referred to as the most interesting 
attribute, and it is x3 in Figures 5.1 to 5.17. The most interesting attribute can also be referred 
to as the primary anomaly indicator because it has the highest number of causalities. For each 
subscriber, this node carries a lot of information and are very helpful for detecting anomalies. 
Observe that x3 has the highest number of causalities such as, 4 in Figure 5.1, 5 in Figure 5.3, 4 in 
Figure 5.5, etc, on the networks. This is a particularly interesting attribute that is common to the 
majority of the subscribers. This shows that, x3 shares information with most of the other nodes 
on the networks. It will thus be important to consider Destination-no (x3) as a primary anomaly 
indicator in conjunction with the longest call duration, which is normally used in existing anomaly 
detection research. 
Furthermore, in a situation where there is need for more than one anomaly indicator, a secondary 
indicator can also be identified from the network. The secondary indicator is the node with the next 
highest number of causalities to the primary indicator. For instance, in Figure 5.1, the primary 
indicator is x3 with 4 causalities as stated above and the secondary indicator is x6 with 3 causalities. 
Therefore, x6 which is Call-cost may also be needed during anomaly detection. 
Thus, the results of our modelling technique efficiently identified the indicators that can enhance 
anomaly detection methods. It also provides qualitative knowledge that will be useful to call 
analysts, managers and anomaly researchers. We used these indicator results in the implementations 
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4.5. TECHNIQUES OF EVALUATING BBN MODELS 
of our system as presented in the following section. 
4.5 Techniques of Evaluating BBN models 
A number of techniques are required to evaluate our methodologies, such as the HGA and the ADS. 
The new HGA designed herein, which mines BBNs from data, can be evaluated using structural 
differences as used by most of the researchers in our literature [67]. The only way to justify the 
universality of our architecture and to assure that our modelling design is reproducible is to use 
publicly available datasets in our implementations. We evaluated the performance of the ADS 
using a cross validation technique, which is visualised by a confusion matrix as described by [37]. 
4.5.1 Structural Evaluation Techniques 
We have further incorporated structural evaluation technique, which is defined in equation 4.17. 
( 4.17) 
L: ¢i is the sum of the symmetric differences between the mined network and the known network. 
In contrast, it is the sum of the similarities between the two networks. The evaluation takes it 
beyond the sum of the symmetric differences in the learned network and the known network. The 
additional possible measures are: [1] MDL score of the optimal network, [2] Duration of mining the 
network structure. 
Also, according to [35], two networks are equivalent if they have the same skeleton and the same set 
of collapsing edges called V-structures. Hence, these evaluation measures are applied in Chapter 
Five. Evaluations of mined networks are performed based on the information provided with the 
known networks or with the publicly available datasets. 
4.5.2 Cross Validation 
Cross Validation is a technique used to ensure the performance of a learned network. This is to 
ascertain the accuracy of probabilistic prediction of a query node on the network. According to 
[58], it is done by setting aside ]( fraction of the known data by using it to test the prediction of 
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4.5. TECHNIQUES OF EVALUATING BBN MODELS 
a hypothesis induced from the remaining data. The common values of K are 5 and 10 and this 
method is therefore also known as leave-one-out cross validation. 
For instance, if the size of a known dataset is 100 and K = 5 or K = 10, then, the test data size 
will be 20 or 10, while the training data size will be 80 or 90 respectively. In anomaly detection, 
test data is CCD and training data is HCD. The detailed result can be visualised as a confusion 
matrix. 
4.5.3 Confusion Matrix 
A confusion matrix is a tabular structure that contains the number of actual and predicted clas-
sifications from a Bayesian network model. The performance of a model as computed with cross 
validation is shown as the occurrence values in the matrix. With reference to Figure 4.2, if we 
suppose that our query node is a sprinkler, then we have the confusion matrix as in Table 4.2. 
The predicted values with Bayesian inference are on the columns while actual values from dataset 
are on the rows. From Table 4.2, w = # of correct predictions that an instance is false, x = # 
of incorrect predictions that an instance is true, y = # of incorrect predictions that an instance is 
false, and also z = # of correct predictions that an instance is true. 
Table 4.2: Confusion Matrix for Dr Watson's Network 
false true 
false w x 
true y z 
The following can be computed from the confusion matrix: 
[i] The percentage accuracy of the model 
= ( w + z ) x 100 
w+x+y+z 
( 4.18) 
that is, total percentage of predictions that were correct. 
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[ii] The false positive rate 
x 
= (--) x 100 
w+x 
that is, the percentage of false instances that were incorrectly predicted as true. 
[iii] The true positive rate 
z 
= (-) x 100 
y+z 
that is, the percentage of true instances that were correctly predicted as true. 
[iv] The false negative rate 
= (-y-) x 100 
y+z 
that is, the percentage of true instances that were incorrectly predicted as false. 
[v] The true negative rate 
w 
= (--) x 100 
w+x 
that is, the percentage of false instances that were predicted correctly as false. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In Figure 4.1, we presented our research system model. 
(4.19) 
( 4.20) 
(4.21) 
( 4.22) 
We designed the DTS that observes and preprocesses datasets, specifically call data. The DTS 
subsystems include the filtering, the discretization and the user-collection subsystems. They were 
designed to easily prepare the CCD and the RCD subsets for individual subscribers. This enhances 
the performance of our entire system development. 
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4.6. CONCLUSION 
Our new Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA) is a variant of the classical genetic algorithm. The 
HGA subsystems were designed in order to be decomposable and is therefore ideally suited to be 
implemented using intelligent agents, which we will explore in future research. 
The use of inner-loops, the control of redundant offspring and the capability to exhaust the solution 
space makes our HGA modelling architecture reliable. The interactions of the HGA with other 
systems such as the DTS and the ADS allow the individual user profiles, namely individually 
selected BBNs. 
Also, our ADS allows the changing behaviour of individual subscribers for example when a sub-
scriber makes a phone call to new destination number. This minimises false alarms. More detail 
on this will be described in the description of the ADS in Chapter Five. Moreover, the use of 
differential analysis is an improvement in our detection system because it allows on-going changing 
behaviour of subscribers. Any inconsistent call record in the CCD can easily be trapped by our 
detection system. 
For adaptive intelligence of our ADS, we included the incremental training loop from the ADS to 
the HCD in our system model. A potential problem for our ADS is if insufficient data is used as 
the training set, it may weaken our detection. 
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Chapter 5 
Implementation Results, Simulations 
and Evaluations 
This chapter presents the implementation results of our algorithms and methodologies as described 
in the previous chapters. Specifically, we provide the implementation results of our DTS, HGA that 
mines the individual subscriber Bayesian networks (BBNs), and the ADS. The implementation of 
our DTS pre-processes real world landline call data for TSP subscribers and produces suitable 
training datasets. By masking the subscribers' phone numbers, we have ensured the confidentiality 
of network carriers, whose policy it is to protect telecommunication customers. 
The implementation of our Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA) used the training dataset prepared 
by the DTS. The true calling behaviour of telecommunication subscribers is reflected in their call 
data, which we visualised as individual Bayesian network models (BBNs). We also visualised the 
simulation results of the HGA optimizations during the mining of the BBNs. The variabilities of the 
different subscriber network models provide evidence of differences in individual calling activities 
that can facilitate the understanding and detection of anomalies in individual subscriber behaviours. 
Also, the implementation of our Anomaly Detection System (ADS) that used the BBNs that were 
mined from the HGA demonstrates the detection of anomalies using daily call data. We obtained 
good results which we will discuss in the next sections. 
Furthermore, this chapter presents three different evaluations and validations of our technologies. 
In the first place, to validate the universality of our architecture, we used publicly available datasets. 
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5.1. DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT OF OUR ALGORITHMS 
We have conducted a number of experiments to benchmark the performance of our HGA method-
ology. We used evaluation data in [49] and [50], and the performance results were promising. In 
the second evaluation, we conducted a test case on our ADS. It measured the performance of ADS 
accuracies in the detection of regular and anomalous calls for individual subscribers. Lastly, we 
tested the sensitivity of the ADS in discriminating between different subscribers. The evaluations 
and the ADS accuracies were good. 
The next section describes the programming language and the hardware that we used for our 
implementation. 
5.1 Development Environment of Our Algorithms 
The system that we implemented consists of the algorithms and the various models presented in 
the previous chapters. It consists of the three subsystems, namely the DTS, the HGA, and the 
ADS. The system was implemented using the Java programming language. 
The hardware configuration is: 
- Pentium(R) 4, CPU 3.00 GHz, 512 MB of RAM. 
The operating system is: 
- Microsoft Windows XP platform. 
Specifically, our software implementations are in Java 5.0 using Eclipse as the IDE (Integrated 
Development Environment) [17]. Certain representative results are shown in the sections that 
follow. 
5.2 Data Transformation System (DTS) Results 
The DTS preprocesses and produces a suitable informative training dataset for the modelling 
architecture. The subsystems of DTS are: the filtering, the discretization and the user-collection 
subsystems. 
Using the phone calls dataset, the filtering subsystem preprocessed data for over 160 subscribers, 
and more than 73,000 calls with 9 attributes. The major input requirements of DTS are the data 
types (CSV, text, database etc) it reads which must include originating call numbers on the first 
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5.2. DATA TRANSFORMATION SYSTEM (DTS) RESULTS 
Table 5.1: Some call records for subscriber 145521100, which were extracted before being processed 
by the DTS 
Orig-No Call-date Durat dest-no dest-net Location Call-cost p/o rec-code 
145521100 2004/04/30 21 145571002 National 0-50Km 0.49 P 
145521100 2004/05/06 26 145521613 National 0-50Km 0.49 P 
145521100 2004/05/13 90 117807666 National >50Km 1.3 P 
145521100 2004/05/18 41 12124268783 International USA 1.81 X 
Legend: Ong-No = ongmatmg-No, Durat = DuratIOn, dest-no = destmatIOn-No, dest-net = 
destination-net, rec-code = record-code, and p/o = peak/off-peak. 
2250 
2250 
2250 
2250 
column of the call dataset. The output of the filtering subsystem serves as the input for the 
discretization subsystem, and its functionalities maintain discrete values in discrete intervals, and 
continuous values in continuous intervals (see columns Duration and Call-cost in Table 5.2). 
The user-collection subsystem receives output from the discretization subsystem and extracts an 
informative call dataset for each individual subscriber with the attributes and node names. For 
instance, the DTS observed and preprocessed the original sampled call data in Table 5.1. It may be 
difficult to understand the table through inspection. The preprocessed informative result is shown 
in Table 5.2. This table is a mixed dataset. Most other anomaly detection researchers use only 
continuous attributes [2]. This mixed dataset is more meaningful because of the inclusion of the 
days of the week and the discretization results. We shortened some column names in the tables 
and we provided their meanings as a legend below Table 5.1. 
According to the TSP that provided our test data (Nebula Systems), the peak period calls are 
made during the daytime, while the off-peak period is over-night. We excluded originating-No from 
modelling a subscriber's behaviour because it does not exhibit any cause-effect relationships to 
other nodes. In other words, the originating-No in the dataset is the same for all records and does 
not contribute any information to mine Bayesian networks (BBNs). The training set is used by the 
HGA algorithms to mine the BBNs and helps in better interpretation by the ADS. For more detail 
on the DTS implementation design, consult the class diagram in Figure A.1 in Appendix A. 
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5.3. POPULATION CONSTRUCTION WITH CROSSOVER PROCESS 
RESULTS 
Table 5.2: The training set observed for subscriber 145521100 after being processed by the DTS 
Call-date Duration destination-No dest-net Location Call-cost peak/ off-peak 
Sunday 0-44 145571002 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 P 
Sunday 0-44 145521613 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 P 
Sunday 87-131 117807666 National >50Km 1.25874-2.51748 P 
Friday 0-44 12124268783 International USA 1.25874-2.51748 X 
5.3 Population Construction with Crossover Process Results 
With reference to the genetic algorithm terms defined in our literature review and discussion of 
the methodology, the mathematical Poset lattice generates the network space, from which optimal 
Bayesian network models are mined. The attributes of the training set are used to construct the 
population from one generation to another. Table 5.3 shows the results of a solution space for 
candidate network models generated by our HGA using the call data. 
Table 5.3: The crossover process results of Hybrid Genetic Algorithm using the attributes in table 
5.4 of our call data 
{x6,x7} 
{x5,x6} {x5,x7} 
Second Generation {x4,x5} {x4,x6} {x4,x7} 
{x3,x4} {x3,x5} {x3,x6} {x3,x7} 
{x2,x3} {x2,x4} {x2,x5} {x2,x6} {x2,x7} 
{x1,x2} {x1,x3} {x1,x4} {x1,x5} {x1,x6} {x1,x7} 
First Generation {xl} {x2} {x3} {x4} {x5} {x6} {x7} 
We define the first generation as the generation that consists of singleton sets called parents, while 
the second generation consists of sets that are the offspring of crossover processes (see Table 5.3). 
Each offspring is a set containing only two attributes. Higher generations of offspring are monitored 
with the use of the inner-loops in the implementation of our HGA. Higher generations of offspring 
without control will introduce redundancies and our inner-loops consist of the EDA and the MI 
described in Chapter Four. 
For instance, a new offspring {xl, x2, x3} can be constructed, which belong to the third generation 
and may not be fit as a sub-candidate network. The following individuals: {xl, x2}, {xl, x3} and 
{x2, x3}, which are already in the second generation, formed the new parents of the offspring {xl, 
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5.4. VISUALISATIONS OF SUBSCRIBERS' BEHAVIOURAL 
BAYESIAN NETWORKS (BBN) MINED BY THE HGA 
x2, x3}. During the mining process, any of the individuals {xl, x2}, {xl, x3} or {x2, x3} is selected 
during fitness competition as a sub-candidate network. The competition is performed using the 
EDA and higher generations of offspring form new sub-candidate networks. Therefore, instead of 
producing several offspring of more than two attributes, the second generation offspring generate 
only the ones with the best fitness for the third or higher generations. 
We use this method to save reproduction and construction time, to manage memory and to reduce 
redundant offspring, which may not be fit as sub-candidate networks. 
5.4 Visualisations of Subscribers' Behavioural Bayesian Networks 
(BBN) Mined By the HGA 
In this section, we describe the implementation results of our hybrid genetic algorithm using the 
algorithms and models described in Chapter Four. We visualised nine subscribers BBNs as the 
implementation results of the HGA. 
The HGA subsystems that were implemented include the fitness function (MDL), the EDA, the 
MI etc. For more detail on the implementation design, consult the class design in Figure A.2 in 
Appendix A. The HGA generated individual subscriber models using Java which can be presented in 
XML-BIF, database, CSV (comma separated variable) or text file formats. We have used JavaBayes 
to visualise the BBN models. 
The following Figures in 5.1 to 5.17 are some of the subscribers' BBN models that were generated in 
this research using preprocessed call data such as Table 5.2. Each of these BBN models was mined 
with different data sizes depending on the call behaviour of individual subscriber. On average, 
every model was mined by the HGA using 650 call records. Table 5.4 lists the call attributes and 
their corresponding node names in the Bayesian networks. Originating number (xO) is not used as 
part of the modelling because it stays the same for individual subscribers. 
The variabilities of these networks illustrate the difference in individual subscribers behaviour. This 
confirmed that a single general model cannot be used effectively to model all subscribers. 
The patterns of calls are reflected and identified in the relationships mined from the call attributes. 
These relationships are referred to as qualitative knowledge. The quantitative knowledge is captured 
in the CPTs. During Bayesian inference, the ADS uses the qualitative and quantitative knowledge 
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5.6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS OF THE HGA 
solution space at implementations. Furthermore, to be certain about the global minimum scores, 
we repeated mining the BBNs in Figures 5.1 to 5.17 at times without number, same results were 
obtained. If there were local minimum scores, there would have been at least one different result. 
We wrote scripts using open source software called Gnuplot [64] to simulate and visualise the 
optimisation results generated from our system. The simulation results that correspond to the 
subscribers' models are shown in Figures 5.2 to 5.18. 
By studying Figures 5.2 to 5.18, it is evident that there are points on the graphs that could have 
been local minima. These are horizontal points at the middle of the graphs that appear as local 
convergence. These periods could be wastage of time but advanced fitness functions may minimise 
this. 
5.6 Performance Evaluations of the HGA 
This section presents the performance of our Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA) in mining Bayesian 
network models from datasets. 
We used publicly available datasets with the evaluation information supplied with them, and open 
source software to evaluate our modelling architecture. As discussed in Chapter Four, we used 
public datasets in the UCI repository [49] and the dataset provided by Nilsson [50]. We used Weka 
[69] and an evaluation copy of a machine learning software package called BayesiaLab [3] to evaluate 
some of our results as shown in the next sections. 
5.6.1 Structural Evaluations by using the Nilsson Network as Benchmark 
This subsection provides structural evaluations by measuring the similarities between the network 
mined by our HGA and the Nilsson network using the same dataset. We confirmed this measure-
ment by comparing the resulting network with the networks mined using two different software 
packages. 
Nilsson [50] provides, together with the benchmarking network, a small dataset that contains the 
operation of a block-lifting machine. Nilsson models the behaviour of the machine with its battery, 
monitors if the arm of the machine moves when holding the block, and monitors if a block is liftable. 
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5.6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS OF THE HGA 
From the results in Figures 5.19 to 5.22, the similarity of our model as compared with the Nilsson, 
Weka, and BayesiaLab models were computed and presented in Table 5.5. We have computed 
the measures of similarity in percentages using equation 4.17. By comparing Nilsson's network 
in Figure 5.19 with Figure 5.20, it shows that there is an opposite orientation between nodes G 
and B. Since there is one symmetric difference on the arc with the two networks, the similarity is 
computed as: 
(2/3 * 100) % 
~ 66.67% 
As compared with Figures 5.21 and 5.22, the symmetric difference is zero. This implies that the 
similarity is: 
(3/3 * 100) % 
~ 100% 
The percentage similarities can change depending on the datasets and the parameters used in the 
learning algorithms. 
Table 5.5: Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA) Modelling Similarities 
Weka GA BayesiaLab GA 
100% 100% 
The significance of the similarity measures is to ensure that a newly developed search algorithm can 
discover at least some related links between network variables as existing search algorithms. Even 
though many Bayesian network researchers [27] said since arcs are not unique, only links should be 
considered but not the arcs when comparing two networks, we still include both arcs and links in 
some of our measurements. 
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5.7. BBN APPLICATIONS TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANOMALY 
DETECTION 
length score of the network is 2372.535 bits. 
The similarities of our HGA model results as compared with the existing models used in this section 
made our modelling architecture applicable to other applications [56]. 
The next section describes the identification of most interesting attributes in mined networks. This 
is useful and was used to improve the effectiveness of our ADS. 
5.7 BBN Applications to Telecommunications Anomaly Detection 
In this section, we present our modelling architecture as applied to anomaly detection in telecom-
munications call data. We experimented with our ADS by using five subscribers and we performed 
two evaluation test cases on the ADS. The experiments of the ADS detected possible anomalies in 
daily calls. The ADS was first evaluated with respect to its effectiveness in detecting anomalies 
within a subscriber's behaviour while the second test confirmed if it could identify one subscriber's 
calls using another subscriber's model. The ADS gave good and interpretable results. 
We have designed, implemented and evaluated the HGA to mine Bayesian network structures. As 
presented in the preceding sections of this chapter, the evolved BBNs represent the behaviour of 
individual subscribers. We tested the effectiveness of our models using the Anomaly Detection 
System (ADS), to detect regular and anomalous phone calls. In our ADS implementation, we used 
primary and secondary anomaly indicators as query nodes. 
Recall from the preceding section that the primary and secondary anomaly indicators for Figure 5.1 
are Destination-no and Call-cost respectively. Using the BBN of Figure 5.1, examples of anomaly 
detection queries used during Bayesian inference by the ADS are given in equations 5.1 and 5.2. 
We used the secondary anomaly indicator as a query node as in equation 5.2 because subscribers 
regularly make calls to new destination numbers. This makes the primary anomaly indicator in 
equation 5.1 incapable of giving a correct inference result. Therefore, we allowed calls made to new 
destination numbers by changing the query nodes. 
Pr(DestinationN 0 = 828050678 I Location = " > 50km", Duration = 120, Call Date = 
Wednesday, DestinationN et = Cellular, Call Cost = 7.55244, Peak/O f f Peak = P) (5.1) 
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5.7. BBN APPLICATIONS TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANOMALY 
DETECTION 
Pr(CallCost = 7.55244 I Location = " > 50km", Duration = 120, CallDate = Wednesday, 
DestinationNet = Cellular,PeakjOjjPeak = P,DestinationNo = 828050678) (5.2) 
As shown in our system model (see Figure 4.1), the RGA mined Bayesian network models (BBNs) 
for individual subscribers using historical call datasets (RCD). The ADS used the RCD subsets 
for individual subscribers to train the evolved BBNs and to update the CPTs. The ADS used 
the trained BBNs to detect regular and anomalous calls from the CCD subsets for individual 
subscribers. The regular calls are used to incrementally train the BBNs but the anomalous calls 
are excluded for TSP investigation. Only those anomalous calls identified by the TSP as regular 
calls, are added to the RCD. 
We used daily transactions in this research. Our ADS is a able to detect anomalies in real time 
but in the prototype, we process daily transactions. The ADS minimises response time using daily 
transactional processing. This improves on most existing batch anomaly detection systems. 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF ANOMALY DETECTION ON 
DAILY CALLS IN CURRENT CALL DATASETS (CCD) 
The following are examples of the daily detection results that were generated from our implemen-
tations using five subscribers. 
ADS Results for Subscriber 1 
From our implementations, we present a RCD subset for subscriber 145521137, in Table 5.6. The 
meanings of the column names are set out on the legend at the bottom of the table. 
The complete dataset for the RCD subset for Table 5.6 was used by our RGA to mine the Behav-
ioural Bayesian Network in Figure 5.1. 
Our ADS trained and used the model in Figure 5.1, to act upon the daily call records, and anomalous 
and regular calls were detected as shown in Table 5.7. The table shows the call detection results 
for the phone calls that were made on the last day, Saturday. All regular call events are used to 
incrementally train the model to actualise adaptive intelligence. Observe that the degree of belief 
for each call event is very clear and can therefore assist call managers to make reliable decisions. 
For example, the first call event in Table 5.7 was detected as regular with degree of belief of 83.489 
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5.7. BBN APPLICATIONS TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANOMALY 
DETECTION 
%. This gives the call manager the confidence to claim the cost from the subscriber. However, the 
last call event result that was detected as regular, only has a degree of belief of 4.441 %. This low 
percentage is due to the use of the secondary anomaly indicator rather than the primary anomaly 
indicator. This is an example of a call made to a possible new phone number because this particular 
call record has a characteristic behaviour reflected in the historical behaviour of this subscriber. 
ADS Results for Subscriber 2 
The subset of the HCD for subscriber 145521198, is shown in Table 5.8, which was used by our 
HGA to mine the BBN in Figure 5.3. 
The model in Figure 5.3 was used by the ADS, and anomalous and regular calls were detected as 
shown in Table 5.9. This table shows the call detection results for the phone calls that were made 
on Sunday. Observe that the first call event was detected as anomalous with the degree of belief of 
54.615 %. This gives the call manager the confidence to see that there is indeed an inconsistency in 
the call patterns of this subscriber. This might have been attributed to one of the causes stated in 
our introduction, namely unintended expensive mistakes, potential fraud etc, and the appropriate 
action can be taken by the TSP. 
The similar ADS results for the other three subscribers are included in Appendix B. 
Table 5.6: Observed training set for subscriber 145521137 
xl x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 
Wednesday 218-261 828050678 Cellular (Vodacom) 6.293699999999999-7.55244 
Wednesday 87-131 849001100 Cellular (Cell-C) 2.51748-3.77622 
Friday 44-87 1023 Special Services 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 
Saturday 0-44 824442726 Cellular (Vodacom) 1.25874-2.51748 
Saturday 131-174 835575170 Cellular (MTN) 3.77622-5.03496 
Sunday 44-87 824442726 Cellular (Vodacom) 1.25874-2.51748 
Sunday 0-44 824442726 Cellular (Vodacom) 1.25874-2.51748 
Tuesday 0-44 145924180 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 
Thursday 0-44 836838283 Cellular (MTN) 1.25874-2.51748 
Monday 87-131 829778104 Cellular (Vodacom) 1.25874-2.51748 
" " " " " " 
Legend: xl = Call-date, x2 = Duration, x3 = Destination-no, x4 = Destination-net, x5 = Location, 
x6 = Call-cost, x7 = Peak/off-peak 
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5.7. BBN APPLICATIONS TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANOMALY 
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Table 5 7· ADS Detects Current Calls for subscriber 145521137 ..
Daily Call Events 
[Saturday, 44-87, 828581169, Cellular, (Vodacom), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 83.489% 
[Saturday, 0-44, 836431694, Cellular, (MTN), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 30.372 % 
[Saturday, 0-44, 834143703, Cellular, (MTN), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 65.186 % 
[Saturday, 44-87, 822302000, Cellular, (Vodacom), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 45.603 % 
[Saturday, 87-131, 834105953, Cellular, (MTN), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 4.441 % 
" 
Table 5.8: Observed training set for subscriber 145521198 
xl x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 
Friday 44-87 113291200 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 
Friday 44-87 145663811 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 
Saturday 44-87 183971500 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 
Sunday 0-44 145521710 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 
Thursday 87-131 117807444 National >50Km 1.25874-2.51748 
Thursday 0-44 828057570 Cellular (Vodacom) 1.25874-2.51748 
Monday 0-44 828032536 Cellular (Vodacom) 1.25874-2.51748 
Wednesday 131-174 824673337 Cellular (Vodacom) 3.77622-5.03496 
" " " " " " 
x7 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
" 
Legend: xl = Call-date, x2 = Duration, x3 = Destination-no, x4 = Destination-net, x5 = Location, 
x6 = Call-cost, x7 = Peak/off-peak 
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5.7. BBN APPLICATIONS TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANOMALY 
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Table 5.9: ADS Detects Current Calls for subscriber 145521198 
Daily Call Events 
[Sunday, 44-87, 832280426, Cellular, (MTN), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 54.615 % 
[Sunday, 44-87,117807444, National, >50Km, 0.0-1.25874, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 55.557 % 
[Sunday, 0-44, 834581134, Cellular, (MTN), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 54.615 % 
[Sunday, 44-87, 828058678, Cellular, (Vodacom), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 92.862 % 
[Sunday, 0-44, 832510192, Cellular, (MTN), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 51.779 % 
" 
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5.7. BBN APPLICATIONS TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANOMALY 
DETECTION 
5.7.1 Performance Evaluation of the Anomaly Detection System (ADS) 
Since telecommunication services providers (TSP) cannot easily make call data available to re-
searchers, the scientific alternative is the use of cross validation techniques as discussed in Chapter 
Four. We used the 90% and 10% cross validation technique to evaluate the performance of our 
implemented Anomaly Detection System (ADS). We present three test cases as shown in the sub-
sequent sub-sections. 
We used cross validation for the subscribers, whose daily calls were classified in the preceding 
subsection. We evaluated the accuracy of ADS by comparing the expected call data and the actual 
calls detected for every subscriber. 
TEST CASE ONE: ANOMALY DETECTION WITHIN 
A SUBSCRIBER'S PROFILE 
In test case one, we identified regular and anomalous calls from every subscriber's call data. The 
90% of a subscriber's call data was used as a training set while the 10% was chosen at random as 
a test set. This was repeated for the five subscribers and the ADS accuracies were computed as 
shown in the next sections. 
ADS Accuracies for Subscriber 1 
Using the cross validation technique, the expected call data from the test set is shown in Table 
5.10. This is because domain experts did not expect any anomalies. That is, none of the training 
records was known as anomalous before modelling. 
Table 5.10: Expected Call Detection Results for subscriber 145521137. 
Total 
Regular Calls 40 
Anomaly Calls 0 
The confusion matrix generated from our implementations, in respect of subscriber 145521137, is 
shown in Table 5.11. 
The ADS accuracy for subscriber 145521137, is 87.5 % . This is the true positive rate while the 
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Table 5.11: Confusion Matrix Results for subscriber 145521137 
Expected; Predicted Regular Anomaly 
Regular: 35.0 5.0 
Anomaly: 0.0 0.0 
false alarm rate is 12.5 % 
That is, the anomalous calls are regarded as false call detections. 
ADS Accuracies for Subscriber 2 
The expected call data from the test set is shown in Table 5.12. The confusion matrix generated 
in respect of subscriber 145521198 is shown in Table 5.13. 
The ADS accuracy for subscriber 145521198 is 58.065 %. This is the true positive rate while the 
false alarm rate is 41.935 % 
Table 5.12: Expected Call Detection Results for subscriber 145521198 
Total 
Regular Calls 31 
Anomaly Calls 0 
Table 5.13: Confusion Matrix Results for subscriber 145521198 
Expected; Predicted Regular Anomaly 
Regular: 18.0 13.0 
Anomaly: 0.0 0.0 
Similar ADS accuracies for the other three subscribers are shown in Appendix C. 
Overall Accuracies of the ADS 
The overall accuracy (true positive rate) of our anomaly detection system can be defined as the 
average of the ADS accuracies for the five subscribers. The overall accuracy from our implementa-
tions is: 
82.880 % 
102 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
5,7 BB,V .lPPLICX1'JOS.'i' TO l'LLJ:;COAHlIiSI('Xl'IO .... '.'i' ASOMALY 
DETE(TIOII; 
In addir.ion 1.0 th~ intAT I'r<'tal.ion8 lor " h~ d~)(ru,," or lwlids 01 the' ADS r<."'ult", "" now pr<."""nt 
d"uali" .. d illl."'1""t"tioll' i<." 81wwIl ill F'i~UI~ 5.2~, FIom tl~, ddeC\io::l I<',nlh on t ,"'t cas", one, the 
,imuI:ltic)ll t,e::lds of the true pu;iti\~' mWs ,uld the fal"., almrru; (an()mali~s) fJI~ "h()wn in Fi!l'j1'~ 
C,,1~. \\'~ sPf'Cificaliv f<'f~rroo ,.() anomali"" hArA i<." falf>' alarm, 1.,., .. :au,,' th"y W~T[' lLOt "XI-"'('l,'d , 
.\!()f<' infmmation is provirioo in 161. Ci<.'lf' 01L~ ill Ch"lw'r ViH'. It i, ck'" rrom tlw graph that "" 
"",ximis,x, co r,,'ct pncdidions (true po_itiV[' r~t"s) and mimmi"",d false "la:Iln" 
\Vhell ""mmali,,,, are ~_ewcte~_ in call1'ffmri;, ,_,11""'-] by ~.g. ""inl.~n ri",,j ~xl',"""iw misrak'" pO'nL-
tial Iraud ~,~, th~ ,-l,DS o"tpn " will ""si"t the ciLll ""iLly:;!'> to <juicily l[)cat~ tlw ~"ll r,,-'or~-> wh"f" 
po""ibl~ "-lLom:'li~,; may haW' [)ccufncd, Th~Y::lo IOll!,:er ha", to ""ar,h throll!,:h all the call f(XXlff'" 
:ooii::lg for ""mmalie" With "'"]xx:! t() the AllS 'lllality £01' tcsl ca"" on~. th~ owral! t.rn" p(j~it i,,, 
ra t e (accuracy) or onr AllS was "-2 .5800/,: 
:t .. ". -" '~ 
• 4.' 
Fi~ure 5 ,28: Prediction R.m~:s [)f A::mmaly Deknioll Sy,t"m f[)l' rest eN;" 0,)(, 
TEST CASE TWO, "'NOM AT.Y DBTBCl'TON n BT\ .vEE;:\I 
T WO SVBS CRlBERS' l'ROHLES 
Thi, t~,1 ca", is 10 show tIl".' Om ADS l'U::l d"t,,<-,; nul" that weIe made by a ,"oocrilx,r, \l"in!,: the 
mo<,~, of "lLOtlWI ,;ubocrilx'f, 
W3 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
5.7. rm: ... APPU CATrO :"S T O TGL GCO"fMu,\'rCATrOSS A.\'O\-JALY 
1)t;j'},.'('T10,V 
~ O% (}f the HCD I'm a paHicula, subscribe r wa, used llS II ullining "'-'I while 111% w"-" ch(}",-'n llt 
rA ndom 'lS II lest ",I from fIllotber ,n tl.-icriher 's HCU. I:or i tL<l ance_ 90% 0 1" lra; nilJ~ se l· in TIlb le ,di 
w"" ,,;<)< I lo !TI o<:le: cAli ~"-l.l.ern, 0;' 'u L.,cr il", r 14",,2 1 1.37. I (ji{ ill TtLle 5.80 for ,u Lscril"" 1455211%. 
wet> u,*d a:> ,\ test ,ct. TIle expected c,1l1 ddectioll [('"ult, is sho\\,11 ill Table 5.11, 
iotal 
Regular Call, I) 
Allo"",ly Cal), :l-O 
\ Y<, expecwd ,Ill t he det~·ctL'{) c,Il" t o be aJlOrna'.(}US becau",", it i, obviou, that the '-'llll ,,,,-,,-,rds d(} 
n(}t bel(}ng to ,ub.-icriber 1155211:n, lbe sampled detection r",nlt>; when ,\US acted on the te,1 
,.." is shown in Table 5.1" and tbe confnsion matrix is shown in Table ,'i, lii 
Table ,'i,1,,: l est, case 1,wo; .\DS Detacb Cal ls in 1 4,'i52Il~)« dal,ansi lJ ~ 145521 13/'s rt)o d~ 1 
Call Det ection: ,',m"" ,l, 
Call Detection' ,' ''''W,,11 
Call Detection: Allom,lly Cal, SU>'pect<'d 
n"i,(r .... of ndi"f: 100.0 % 
)'lollday. H -S7. 115555291. Na~i(}nill. 0- 501~m, () ,()-1. 35~ 7 1. 1'-
Call ne1. .. ction, Allom,lly Cv, SU>'pect<'d 
negr'" '' of ncli.,f: 100.0 % 
I'or jecl c,",~ lWO, l.l!~ ADS ac.curacy for "uh,(-riLer 115521137 i" 100,U 'J{ , Thi, , 11OW.< that Oul 
lO4 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
5.7. BBN APPLICATIONS TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANOMALY 
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Table 5.16: Test case two: Confusion Matrix Results using subscriber 145521137's model 
Expected; Predicted Regular Anomaly 
Regular: 0.0 0.0 
Anomaly: 0.0 30.0 
ADS is reliable. 
We also repeated this experiment by using subscriber 145521198's data as training and subscriber 
145521137's data as test set. The expected call detection results is shown in Table 5.17. 
Table 5.17: Test case two: Expected Call Detection Results using subscriber 145571198's model 
Total 
Regular Calls 0 
Anomaly Calls 39 
We also expected all the calls in the test set to be anomalous. The detection results of the ADS 
acting on the test set is shown in Table 5.18 and the confusion matrix is shown in Table 5.19. 
For test case two, the ADS detection accuracy for the subscriber 145521198 is 100.0 %. This again 
confirms our ADS to be reliable. 
Thus, it is clear from test case two's results that, the ADS can efficiently classify calls as belonging 
to another subscriber if the BBN of a different subscriber was used as the model. This will typically 
occur during subscription fraud when a handset is stolen. 
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Table 5.18: Test case two: ADS Detects Calls in 145521137's data using 145521198's model 
Daily Call Events 
[Friday, 0-44, 219494280, National, >50Km, 0.0-1.25874, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 100.0 % 
[Monday, 44-87, 824616747, Cellular, (Vodacom), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 100.0 % 
[Saturday, 0-44, 834105953, Cellular, (MTN), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 100.0 % 
[Thursday, 0-44, 842002025, Cellular, (Cell-C), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 100.0 % 
[Sunday, 0-44, 845993456, Cellular, (Cell-C), 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 100.0 % 
" 
Table 5.19: Test case two: Confusion Matrix Results using subscriber 145521198's model 
Expected; Predicted Regular Anomaly 
Regular: 0.0 0.0 
Anomaly: 0.0 39.0 
TEST CASE THREE: ANOMALY DETECTION USING 
TEST SET THAT INCLUDES INTRODUCED ANOMALIES 
Test case three is another scientific way to ascertain that our ADS can convincingly detect anomalies 
from subscribers' daily calls. 
Like previous test cases, we used 90% of the RCD as a training set to model individual subscriber 
behaviour and we randomly generated 10% of anomalous test data called noise. The noise records 
were generated as known anomalies using the properties or data types of the real dataset. We 
repeated these for eight subscribers. The ADS uses most of the BBN models in Figures 5.1 to 5.17 
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to act upon these anomalies. Since all the test records are known anomalies, we expected to have 
100% detected anomalies. For example, Table 5.20 shows some detected call results for subscriber 
145521137. 
Table 5.20: Test case three: some calls detected by the ADS using model for subscriber 145521137 
Daily Call Events 
[[Wednesday, 314-319, 218521142, National, >50Km, 2.088-2.588, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 98.975 % 
[Wednesday, 299-304, 145920661, MobileInternational, >50Km, 5.430-5.930, X] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 98.975 % 
[Tuesday, 168-173, 726765711, National, >50Km, 9.754-10.254, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 97.950 % 
[Monday, 273-278, 145928463, National, 0-50Km, 1.468-1.968, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 94.060 % 
[Friday, 481-486, 118987000, National, >50Km, 5.699-6.199, X] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 97.030 % 
" 
In this case, the calls detected as anomalies are regarded as true detection, while the calls detected 
as regular calls are false alarms. For the efficiency of the ADS, the accuracies of the detection 
are summarised in Table 5.21. For every subscriber, we computed the rate of calls detected as 
percentages. The correctly detected calls are computed as true positive rates, while the incorrectly 
detected calls or false alarms are the error rates. In other words, in this test case, the average 
accuracy of correctly detected anomalies is 74.754 %, while incorrect detection is 25.246 %. 
One of the objectives of our methodology is to maximise true positive rates and minimise false 
alarms. One can see in Table 5.20 that, for every subscriber, the true positive rate is greater than 
the error rate. We cannot have a group model for subscribers who behave in a similar way. If we 
do not have individual models to separate subscribers' behaviours, the false detection rates will be 
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Table 5.22: Summary of results' accuracies for the three test cases 
Test Case Accuracy (%) 
Test Case One 82.880 
Test Case Two 100.0 
Test Case Three 74.754 
Overall Average Accuracy 85.878 
than one test case and probably used a generated data because he proposed to collaborate with 
mobile networks. 
5.8 Conclusion 
For modelling subscribers' behaviour and detecting anomalies from call data, the DTS, the HGA 
and the ADS have been implemented as solutions. We applied our system to landline networks but 
it can easily be applied to mobile data as well. Our implementation addressed all of the research 
questions presented in Chapter One. 
The implementation results of our DTS, which were used by the rest of our system, have validated 
the statement made by machine learning researchers [4]. Berka [4] said preprocessing of data can 
help to better understand the data that enters into machine learning algorithms. The DTS gener-
ated suitable training sets for the HGA to mine subscribers' profiles (BBNs). Moreover, the DTS 
is general in that it can preprocess datasets for other applications other than telecommunications. 
The implementation results of the HGA, that mined individual BBNs, have shown variabilities in 
subscribers' behaviour and as a result, it has shown that the use of one model to group related users 
together in anomaly detection is questionable. Also, the simulation results of our HGA showed that 
it is good for every modelling technique to exhaust the solution space before termination rather 
than using convergence which can get stuck at local minima. Since we obtained good results in our 
evaluations, it encouraged our HGA to be applied to other applications [56]. 
The identification and the use of anomaly indicators as query nodes in our ADS implementations 
gave our system the capability to allow calls made to new destination numbers or existing destina-
tion numbers. We obtained very good overall detection accuracy, 85.878 %. Our first test case on 
the ADS gave reliable results, 82.880 %. The second test case was to differentiate two subscribers 
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which proved 100 % accurate. The third test case detected 74.754 % of known anomalies introduced 
into the call data. Also, the use of daily call detection is an added advantage which will reduce the 
lag time in the existing batch detection systems. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions, Summary of Results and 
Future Research 
In this dissertation, we have designed and implemented a Data Transformation System (DTS) for 
preprocessing datasets, a new genetic algorithm (HGA) for individual subscriber modelling and 
an Anomaly Detection System (ADS) for detecting anomalies in telecommunications call data. 
This concluding chapter will interpret our results, highlight our contributions, and state the future 
directions of this research. 
6.1 Summary and Interpretation of Results 
In Chapter Two, we described how anomalies are caused in telecommunications call data. Specif-
ically, we reviewed the details of fraud in order for TSPs to understand bad practices in their 
networks, and provide insightful information to assist call analysts in making decisions when they 
detect suspicious call records. Related research in telecommunications anomaly detection has been 
described. These investigations enabled us to understand the strength and weaknesses of existing 
detection system so as to mitigate their problems. 
In Chapter Three, we reviewed the background on probabilistic modelling and Bayesian networks. 
We used this knowledge to differentiate singly and multiply-connected networks. We described 
the relationships between Bayesian networks and machine learning. Various techniques of mining 
Bayesian network structures from data were discussed. We discussed our motivations for using 
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6.2. FUTURE RESEARCH 
genetic algorithms. 
In Chapter Four, we presented our overall research system model where we described the detail 
designs and functionalities of the DTS, the HGA and the ADS. We described the Hybrid Genetic 
Algorithm (HGA) that mines Bayesian networks from data using information theoretic measures 
and mathematical components. We discussed how the ADS uses BBN models to detect anomalies 
and we introduced the evaluation techniques used to measure the performance of our system. 
In Chapter Five, we presented the implementation results and the empirical evaluations of our 
algorithms and models. Our results demonstrated that individual subscriber modelling using the 
HGA is better than existing methods that group related users together and also better than existing 
methods that pre-classify anomalies. This was presented as compared with Hollmen's [28] result 
above. With anomaly indicators, we also showed that our ADS effectively detects anomalies from 
call data with subscribers making calls to existing or new phone numbers using landline call data. 
Some of the daily detection results presented with low degrees of beliefs are examples of calls made 
to new destinations. 
Our outcomes have shown that our experimental results on daily call detection, test cases one, two 
and three will provide solutions to the causes of anomalies stated in Chapter One. Specifically, 
bad debt risk and fraud can be trapped during anomaly detection using daily calls. Moreover, the 
graphs in Figures 5.28 and 5.29 shows the trends of minimising false alarms and maximising true 
detections. The results will assist call managers to make adaptive decisions and they can possibly 
tightened their networks. 
6.2 Future Research 
Even though we have established a proof of concept about Bayesian networks applied to telecom-
munications anomaly detection, our system is constrained with mining time, limited to large data 
but takes a long time for very massive datasets, and the capability to handle missing data has not 
been incorporated into this system. Our future research work is shown in the next paragraph. 
As a future direction, we aim to incorporate incremental mining into our hybrid genetic algorithm so 
as to incrementally mine Bayesian networks from massive datasets. Also, there is need to investigate 
and fully explore more advanced fitness functions than the MDL to score Bayesian networks. This 
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will help to improve on the possible local convergence encountered on the optimization trends in 
Figures 5.2 to 5.18. We want to make the HGA more robust by exploiting the ADTree [44] speed 
power and incorporate other machine learning capabilities such as the handling of missing data 
using the Expected Maximisation (EM) algorithms. 
Also, we believe that the improvement on real time detection of ADS from daily grouped records to 
real time detection per call will offer many advantages to the ADS; we aim to incorporate intelligent 
agents into our systems since we have designed them as decomposable systems; and we hope to 
collaborate with a mobile telecommunication service provider for further validation and evaluation 
of these new technologies. 
6.3 Contributions to Knowledge 
Even though, our HGA may take long to mine subscriber profiles from massive datasets, it eventu-
ally produces an optimal network. Our research has provided a general solution to mine individual 
subscriber models and to detect anomalies in telecommunications call data. It opens up many 
future research directions. Our research has made the following contributions: 
• We constructed a new algorithm called the Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA) to mine net-
works from datasets. The use of inner-loops that prevent the HGA network optimization from 
getting worse, the control of redundant offspring and the capability to exhaust the network 
solution space makes our HGA reliable. 
• The HGA is not difficult to understand because it is a simple variant of classical genetic 
algorithms unlike other GA methods with complex designs, which are difficult to implement. 
The interactions of the HGA with other systems such as the DTS and the ADS show its 
capability as a decomposable system. 
• We mined multiply-connected Bayesian networks with our HGA. Multiply-connected networks 
have more relationships in between the nodes which improves probabilistic reasoning. 
• The variabilities of individual subscriber model as mined by HGA provide enough evidence 
to show that grouping related subscribers together and the use of pre-classified anomalies for 
detection system cannot be effective. 
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• The HGA mines networks from mixed or nominal datasets (which is done by most existing 
systems), as well as mining networks from numerical datasets that is not discretized. 
• The use of primary and secondary anomaly indicators as query nodes give the ADS the capa-
bility to tolerate subscribers making calls to new destination numbers. This understanding 
avoids false alarms. 
• The achievement of adaptive intelligence using Bayesian networks and the differential analysis 
in the ADS help to avoid false detections. 
• The use of the degree of belief (or level of confidence) obtained from our ADS about suspicious 
calls will assist network carriers to make reliable decisions, and will reduce false alarm rates. 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
The most important contribution of this research was the intelligence we achieved with the ADS. 
The intelligence of the ADS is a result of the following: modelling individual BBNs, incremental 
training of the BBNs, use of anomaly indicators, minimising approximations which include the use 
of mixed datasets (numerical and textual data). 
The HGA successfully mined individual subscribers' models which make it suitable to applications 
in various academic areas such as [52], [56]. The HGA provided reliable evaluations for modelling 
similar networks from datasets in various domains. 
From the empirical evaluation test cases, the good performance of the ADS provided an illustrative 
approach to addressing anomaly detection in telecommunications networks. 
It is regrettable that we could not have access to mobile call data but we are fortunate that our 
landline data contains relevant attributes that are equivalent to the mobile data. 
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Appendix B: Implementation Results 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF ANOMALY DETECTION ON 
DAILY CALLS IN CURRENT CALL DATASETS (CCD) 
ADS Results for Subscriber 3 
Table B.l shows the subset of the ReD for subscriber 145571179, which was used by our RGA to 
mine the Behavioural Bayesian Network in Figure 5.11. 
The ADS used the model in Figure 5.11 and detected the daily call records as shown in Table B.2. 
The table shows the call detection results for the phone calls that were made on Thursday. The 
first call event in the table was detected as anomalous with the degree of belief of 95.890 %. As 
was the case with the previous two subscribers, this should trigger the TSP to take the appropriate 
actions. 
ADS Results for Subscriber 4 
The subset of the ReD for subscriber 145571042, is shown in Table B.3. The table was used by 
the RGA to mine the BBN in Figure 5.7. 
Also, the ADS used the model in Figure 5.7, and consequently detected daily calls as shown in 
Table B.4. The table shows the call detection results for the phone calls that were made on Friday. 
All the detection results in the table also take their usual interpretations as stated above. 
ADS Results for Subscriber 5 
The subset of the ReD for subscriber 145571030, is also shown in Table B.5. The RGA used the 
call records and produced the network in Figure 5.17. Furthermore, the ADS used the model in 
Figure 5.17, acted upon the corresponding daily call records, and detected daily calls as shown in 
Table B.6. Observe that, the detected calls were made on Wednesday. 
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Table B.1: Observed training set for subscriber 145571179 
xl x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 
Thursday 261-305 5.41E+11 International Argentina 25.174799999999998-26.43354 
Friday 0-44 145928463 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 
Saturday 305-349 1164622700 National >50Km 1.25874-2.51748 
Sunday 44-87 123001000 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 
Tuesday 44-87 14123695071 International USA 1.25874-2.51748 
Wednesday 0-44 117124000 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 
Monday 0-44 145557056 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 
Monday 87-131 145555283 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 
" " " " " " 
Legend: xl = Call-date, x2 = Duration, x3 = Destination-no, x4 = Destination-net, x5 = Location, 
x6 = Call-cost, x7 = Peak/off-peak 
Table B 2· ADS Detects Current Calls for subscriber 145571179 ..
Daily Call Events 
[Thursday, 0-44, 183810180, National, >50Km, 0.0-1.25874, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 95.890 % 
[Thursday, 0-44, 145928463, National, 0-50Km, 0.0-1.25874, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 95.419 % 
[Thursday, 392-436, 145521261, National, 0-50Km, 1.25874-2.51748, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 97.209 % 
[Thursday, 0-44, 145556040, National, 0-50Km, 0.0-1.25874, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 91.780 % 
" 
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Table B.3: Observed training set for subscriber 145571042 
xl x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 
Wednesday 0-44 119388443 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 P 
Wednesday 0-44 118735119 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 P 
Thursday 0-44 18593127172 International USA 0.0-1.25874 X 
Friday 0-44 117124000 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 X 
Saturday 0-44 145928463 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 X 
Sunday 44-87 128040300 National >50Km 1.25874-2.51748 P 
Monday 0-44 145521517 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 X 
Tuesday 131-174 126644157 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 X 
" " " " " " " 
Legend: xl = Call-date, x2 = Duration, x3 = Destination-no, x4 = Destination-net, x5 = Location, 
x6 = Call-cost, x7 = Peak/off-peak 
Table B 4· ADS Detects Current Calls for subscriber 145571042 .. 
Daily Call Events 
[Friday, 784-828, 112777000, ISPNational, >50Km, 11.32866-12.587399999999999, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 44.019 % 
[Friday, 0-44, 145928463, National, 0-50Km, 0.0-1.25874, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 68.847 % 
[Friday, 174-218, 116368113, National, >50Km, 2.51748-3.77622, P] 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 28.287 % 
[Friday, 0-44, 437353335, National, >50Km, 0.0-1.25874, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 95.207 % 
[Friday, 44-87, 145966727, National, 0-50Km, 0.0-1.25874, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 96.136 % 
[Friday, 349-392, 2603321122, International, Zambia, 16.36362-17.62236, P] 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 97.604 % 
" 
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Table B.5: Observed training set for subscriber 145571030 
xl x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 
Wednesday 0-44 123001000 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 X 
Thursday 0-44 123001000 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 X 
Friday 44-87 145970789 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 X 
Saturday 87-131 145970789 National 0-50Km 0.0-1.25874 X 
Sunday 87-131 415077777 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 X 
Tuesday 0-44 117124000 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 X 
Monday 44-87 123001000 National >50Km 0.0-1.25874 P 
" " " " " " " 
Legend: xl = Call-date, x2 = Duration, x3 = Destination-no, x4 = Destination-net, x5 = Location, 
x6 = Call-cost, x7 = Peak/off-peak 
Table B 6· ADS Detects Current Calls for subscriber 145571030 ..
Daily Call Events 
[Wednesday, 0-44, 118875553, National, >50Km, 0.0-1.25874, Xl 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 57.598 % 
[Wednesday, 436-479, 152905429, National, >50Km, 2.51748-3.77622, Xl 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 57.598 % 
[Wednesday, 0-44, 123001000, National, >50Km, 0.0-1.25874, Xl 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 95.511 % 
[Wednesday, 44-87, 145526000, National, 0-50Km, 0.0-1.25874, Pl 
Call Detection: Anomaly Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 23.026 % 
[Wednesday, 44-87, 19546005957, International, USA, 2.51748-3.77622, Xl 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 89.634 % 
[Wednesday, 44-87, 117124000, National, >50Km, 0.0-1.25874, Xl 
Call Detection: Regular Call Suspected 
Degree of Belief: 97.755 % 
" 
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TEST CASE ONE: ANOMALY DETECTION WITHIN 
A SUBSCRIBER'S PROFILE 
ADS Accuracies for Subscriber 3 
Table B.7 shows the expected call data from the test set using the cross validation technique. The 
confusion matrix in respect of subscriber 145571179 is also presented in Table B.8. 
Furthermore, ADS accuracy in respect of subscriber 145571179, is 77.358 %. This is the true 
positive rate while the false alarm rate is 22.642 % 
Table B.7: Expected Call Detection Results for subscriber 145571179 
Total 
Regular Calls 53 
Anomaly Calls 0 
Table B.8· Confusion Matrix Results for subscriber 145571179 
Expected; Predicted Regular Anomaly 
Regular: 41.0 12.0 
Anomaly: 0.0 0.0 
ADS Accuracies for Subscriber 4 
Table B.9 also shows the expected call data from the test set. Table B.10 shows the confusion 
matrix in respect of subscriber 145571024. Also, the ADS accuracy for subscriber 145571024 is 
97.633 %. This is the true positive rate while the false alarm rate is 2.367 % . 
Table B.9: Expected Call Detection Results for subscriber 145571024 
Total 
Regular Calls 169 
Anomaly Calls 0 
Table B.10· Confusion Matrix Results for subscriber 145571024 
Expected; Predicted Regular Anomaly 
Regular: 165.0 4.0 
Anomaly: 0.0 0.0 
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ADS Accuracies for Subscriber 5 
The expected call data from the test set is also shown in Table B.ll using the cross validation 
technique. The confusion matrix generated from our implementations, in respect of subscriber 
145571030 is set in Table B.12. 
The ADS accuracy for subscriber 145571030 is 93.846 %. This is the true positive rate while the 
false alarm rate is 6.154 % 
Table B.ll: Expected Call Detection Results for subscriber 145571030 
Total 
Regular Calls 65 
Anomaly Calls 0 
Table B.12· Confusion Matrix Results for subscriber 145571030 
Expected; Predicted Regular Anomaly 
Regular: 61.0 4.0 
Anomaly: 0.0 0.0 
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REVIEWERS' COMMENTS 
• The paper as a whole is interesting. 
• The paper is based on an interesting idea and seems technically sound. 
• This paper has the potential to be a great paper. 
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